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Foreign investment has become a major focus for Americans. It was 
an issue during the 1988 and 1992 Presidential races, and some policy- 
makers believe that there is a link between more foreign investment in 
the United States and the growth of our federal government budget 
deficits. In particular, foreign investment inflows balance the deficit in 
our export-import account, which could result from a lack of private 
and government saving or government deficits.
Some Americans have even come to view foreign investment in the 
United States negatively. In a recent appearance in the then Federal 
Republic of Germany, Bob Hope joked to his audience of United States 
military personnel, "You remember back home, that's the country you 
are protecting for the Japanese (investors)." While the remark drew 
much laughter, it also suggests that most people misunderstand the 
extent to which foreign investors own our country, exactly what they 
own, who the investors are, and what benefits might be associated with 
foreign investment.
Foreign portfolio and direct investments in the United States have 
increased dramatically during the past two decades. 1 By 1989 for 
example, expenditures on new plants and equipment by foreign firms 
located in the United States accounted for 12.3 percent of total nonres- 
idential gross private investment in the United States and the percent 
age grew steadily throughout the 1980s (Bezirganian 1991). Such 
trends have caused alarm in some quarters, because the earnings on 
capital in the United States will increasingly accrue to persons living 
outside of the United States.
On the other hand, direct foreign investment creates jobs, about 4.4 
million jobs as of 1989. In 1989,4.8 percent of the United States work 
force were employed by a foreign-held firm, and 9.3 percent of the 
manufacturing workforce were employed by a foreign-held firm 
(Bezirganian 1991).
In addition, aggregate saving for use in financing domestic invest 
ment in the United States is low, and foreign investment augments our
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capital stock and enhances the productivity of our workforce. Not only 
may additional capital raise productivity and real wages of workers, 
but the new capital may embody technological advances that com 
pound the effect of added capital on our economic growth. Moreover, 
foreign plants have brought to the workplace new management prac 
tices which, in many cases, have arguably heightened worker satisfac 
tion and efficiency. Thus, it could be said that foreign investment has 
spared our nation from an otherwise more dire employment picture and 
national recession. If there is a problem with foreign investment being 
an increasing share of our total investment, the problem might be bet 
ter cast as our investing too little in our physical capital rather than for 
eigners investing too much.
While a broad overview may belie the title of this book, we believe 
that a thorough understanding of what foreign investment is and the 
theory that surrounds its origins is necessary to understand the implica 
tions of foreign investment for a nation or a state. Ultimately, however, 
we want to help state policymakers understand what drives the location 
choices of foreign plants. Our findings may help states shape, refocus, 
and refine their recruitment strategies for foreign plants.
A number of studies of foreign plant locations exist. We augment 
the evidence by using a larger data set spanning many more years and 
by experimenting with more general and efficient econometric tech 
niques. In examining the factors that influence the state location deci 
sions of new foreign plants, we use a pooled cross-section and time- 
series data set for states of individual manufacturing plant location 
choices for the period 1978 to 1987. 2 In the end, we are not as con 
vinced as others seem to be that certain aspects of state and local taxa 
tion and spending significantly influence foreign plant location 
decisions.
The difficulty of modeling the taxation of foreign corporations 
should not be underestimated, however. As we show in more detail 
later in this chapter, the taxation of companies in general, and of multi 
national companies in particular, is so complex that making a priori 
predictions about the effects of tax policy is heroic indeed. We empha 
size that in a domestic corporate setting it seems generally safe to 
argue that specific changes in tax policy will likely have the expected 
incentive effects on whatever behavior is being modeled, other things 
equal. However, in the case of multinational companies, the system of
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intercountry tax credits and treaties and the opportunities to avoid taxa 
tion may make it difficult to understand whether a specific tax action in 
a country indeed raises taxes to multinational corporations located 
within its borders.
We have two main objectives in this chapter. First, we elaborate on 
the broader economic and taxation issues that surround foreign direct 
investment. Beginning with the definitions of foreign direct invest 
ment, we then explain inward (foreign investments in the United 
States) and outward (U.S. investments outside the United States) 
trends in foreign investment over time. The discussion turns to an 
examination of economic theories of foreign investment, or why inves 
tors produce in other countries. We then examine the economic impli 
cations of our debtor nation status for investment and growth in the 
United States.
Armed with this overview of aggregate investment trends and their 
implications, we turn to how taxation might affect foreign investment 
at both the national and the state and local levels. In that context, we 
discuss "economically efficient" taxation of international capital before 
we introduce the complexities of actual tax laws as they apply to multi 
national corporations.
A second objective of the chapter is to introduce the location data 
used to examine the foreign direct investment trends in various states 
and industries within the United States. Here, we present the types of 
foreign direct investments by year and the number of new manufactur 
ing plants by industry group and by country of the major investor.
The Larger Setting
An understanding of the broad picture surrounding foreign invest 
ment is useful in making policy recommendations to states about 
attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). Knowledge of the signifi 
cance of FDI in our economy, whether national policies thwart FDI, 
and how FDI affects our national well-being should all play a role in 
the design of state policies to attract FDI. In this section of the chapter, 
we focus on the broad implications of FDI to deepen the understanding
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of our FDI location results and the policy recommendations that may 
flow from them.
Definitions of Foreign Investment
At an aggregate level, foreign investment includes both portfolio 
and direct investment. Portfolio assets are stocks, bonds, and other pri 
vate and government-held securities. FDI, however, does not corre 
spond to investment in plant and equipment as we know it. An 
awareness of the differences between the definition of FDI and more 
common National Income and Product Account definitions of invest 
ment in plant and equipment will illuminate some of the results pre 
sented in the empirical literature. 3
FDI is measured as earnings retained by subsidiaries or branches in 
the United States and transfers of funds from parent firms to their for 
eign subsidiaries in the United States. The transfers include both debt 
and equity raised capital. The measurement of FDI, therefore, omits 
the investment made by the foreign subsidiaries when the capital is 
borrowed either within the host country or in a third country. In addi 
tion, aggregate FDI includes purchases of existing companies and real 
estate transactions. The latter transactions are better described as a 
transfer of assets rather than as new investments in plant and equip 
ment. FDI then is actually a measure of the financial flow of assets. 
Similarly, when the term "foreign investment position" is used, it 
should be understood to mean the financial stock of assets held by for 
eigners, which includes purchases of existing assets but omits invest 
ment financed from the subsidiaries' borrowed funds.4
In addition to the above definitional problems with the measure, the 
U.S. Department of Commerce has measured until recently both 
inward and outward FDI based on the book value of the assets. Thus, it 
failed to revalue the FDI assets to account for inflation and deprecia 
tion as discussed in Slemrod (1989) and Glickman and Woodward 
(1989). The historical or book-value measure of the stocks of FDI in 
countries likely underestimates the value of U.S. outward investment 
(investment abroad) relatively more than inward investment of other 
countries in the United States, as many of the investments of U.S. firms 
were made longer ago than the more recent investments in the United 
States by the Japanese and several other countries.
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Recently, however, the U.S. Department of Commerce has mea 
sured the current-cost and market values of U.S. aggregate inward and 
outward FDI flows. 5 The agency also retrospectively converted the 
aggregate measures of historical or book-value data since 1982 to cur 
rent-cost and market values. But disaggregated FDI flows by country 
or by industry are at this time only available on historical or book- 
value bases.
Another issue in measuring FDI is that the value of foreign invest 
ment is converted to U.S. dollars using exchange rates between coun 
tries, and exchange rate fluctuations can bring large and sometimes 
temporary swings in the measures of investment values. Using the 
more stable, but also controversial, purchasing power parity measure 
to convert investment from foreign currencies to U.S. dollars could 
also change the relative investment standing of the United States vis-a 
vis its inward investors.6
Despite the above-mentioned limitations of the data, it is clear by 
any method of measurement that inward investment in the United 
States has accelerated and U.S. outward investment has decelerated, 
especially in the 1980s. We examine the aggregate trends in U.S. 
inward and outward foreign investment below.
Aggregate Trends in Foreign Investment
Portfolio assets—stocks, bonds, private and government securi 
ties—dominate the U.S. holdings by foreign investors, accounting for 
79 percent of their total (portfolio plus direct) cumulative assets evalu 
ated on a current-cost basis in 1991. FDI, defined as investment in real 
estate and investment in industry, accounts for 21 percent of foreigners' 
total cumulative U.S. asset holdings in 1991 evaluated on a current- 
cost basis (see table 1.1). While the stock of FDI has decreased as a 
percentage of the total foreign capital stock since 1982, when it was 24 
percent of the total inward foreign investment position, FDI stock eval 
uated on a current-cost basis in the United States still grew at a 14 per 
cent annual rate between 1982 and 1991.7
In fact, the rapid increase in inward foreign investment in the United 
States put the net overall investment position of the United States into 
deficit on a current-cost basis in 1987. Moreover, the deficit on a cur 
rent-cost basis increased steadily thereafter and reached $362 billion
Table 1.1 Foreign Investment Position in the United States and U.S. 
Investment Abroad: Historical, Current-Cost and Market 
Value, 1982,1986,1990,1991
1982 1986 1990 1991
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by 1991 (see table 1.1). The net positions of portfolio and direct invest 
ments are quite different, however. The U.S. net position of portfolio 
investment became negative in 1985 and has ballooned to over half a 
trillion dollars by 1991. By contrast, the United States maintained a 
surplus position in FDI of $168 billion on a current-cost basis. None 
theless, inflows of FDI have exceeded outflows during most years in 
the 1980s and the U.S. net surplus position in FDI has been shrinking 
(see figure 1.1).
Panel A of table 1.2 lists the FDI asset values (excluding portfolio) 
in the United States by country of the investor. In 1991, investors in the 
United Kingdom, Japan, the Netherlands, and Canada held 70 percent 
of the FDI asset values in the United States (see table 1.2 Panel B). As 
a percent of total direct foreign asset value, the United Kingdom's 
share has increased from about 23 percent of the total in 1982 to 26 
percent of the total in 1991. During the same nine-year period, Japa 
nese investors increased their share of total FDI stock in the U.S. from 
8 to 21 percent. In contrast, the shares held by Canada, the Nether 
lands, and the group of all other countries have fallen during the 1982 
to 1991 period.
As shown in Panel C of table 1.2, the inward total foreign direct 
investment asset value in the United States grew at a 14 percent annual 
rate during the 1982 to 1991 period. Japanese investors led the growth 
with a 28 percent annual increase, while United Kingdom asset values 
grew at a 16 percent annual rate. The asset values of Canada, the Neth 
erlands, and the aggregate of other countries grew less rapidly than 
those of the United Kingdom and Japan, but still the former group 
averaged annual growth rates between 10 and 11 percent during the 
1982 to 1991 period.
The rapid inflows of FDI to the United States in the 1980s have 
decelerated significantly, however. Between 1990 and 1991, FDI assets 
in the United States increased by less than 3 percent, with Canada and 
the Netherlands not increasing their book value of FDI in the United 
States. The values for the United Kingdom, Japan, and all other coun 
tries also slowed down considerably compared to their growth rates in 
the 1980s. The recession in the United States, as well as slower real 
income growth worldwide, probably contributed to the slowdown in 
U.S. inward FDI.
8 Introduction
Figure 1.1 Net Investment of the United States
Net Portfolio Investment
1982 1986 1990 1991 
Years
To summarize, investors from four countries make most of the 
inward foreign investment in the United States. States that actively 
seek foreign investment might usefully focus their efforts on these four 
countries. Nonetheless, the rate of increase in inward investment from 
all four countries has decreased since 1990 compared to the rates of 
increase during the 1980s. While states are probably less likely to find 
foreign investors in the 1990s than in the 1980s, they may still have a 
higher probability of attracting investments from the heavily investing 
countries of Japan and the United Kingdom than from other countries.
Table 1.2 Foreign Direct Investment Position in the United States, by Country of the Major Investors, 1982,1986, 
1990,1991 (based on historical values)
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Rationales for Investing in Foreign Countries
Why invest in other countries? To address this issue, it is useful to 
distinguish between portfolio and direct investment, as the motivations 
for each type of investment differ. Portfolio investment is motivated by 
differentials in the return to capital between countries and by diversifi 
cation of investors' portfolios. Tax considerations, exchange rate risk, 
and other factors that affect the return to capital will enter investors' 
decisions about where (in which countries) to invest.
Cost of capital might also drive decisions about direct investment in 
other countries. But industrial organization motivations may also 
explain FDI. Given the competing theories explaining FDI, we turn to 
a fuller discussion of the motivations for FDI.
In a smooth neoclassical world, for example, factors and goods 
would flow freely among countries and leave little scope for direct 
investment. But sustained differentials among countries in the cost of 
capital could induce FDI, because lower capital costs in some countries 
will reduce production costs and create competitive advantages.
Graham and Krugman (1991) note that more sophisticated cost-of- 
capital theories might explain some of the investment flows. For exam 
ple, foreign investors might discount long-term corporate profit flows 
at lower real interest rates and thus value a U.S. firm more highly than 
a domestic investor would. A second capital-cost theory begins with 
foreign corporations generating higher profits than domestic firms. 
Then, if internally generated funds are viewed as less costly than rais 
ing equity or borrowing, foreign firms with cash will have a lower cost 
of capital for investment than domestic firms, while domestic firms 
with lower earnings might have to finance the investment using higher- 
cost equity or borrowing instruments.
In addition, tax differentials among countries could also cause varia 
tion in the marginal effective returns to direct investments among 
investors from different countries. Due to the complexities involved in 
the taxation of international capital, however, perceived differentials in 
tax rates will not necessarily translate directly to different marginal 
effective tax rates among countries. International tax aspects of capital 
are discussed in more detail in a subsequent section of this chapter.
A troublesome point, however, with the differential cost-of-capital 
explanation of FDI is that differentials in the cost of capital among
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countries explain one-way but not the two-way flows of capital that are 
commonly observed between countries. Some economists, therefore, 
have suggested that imperfect competition and industrial organization 
considerations rather than the cost of capital explain FDI flows among 
countries. In fact, industrial organization theories of foreign direct 
investment have competed with the cost-of-capital approach for some 
time (Hymer 1976). Industrial organization explanations rely on com 
petitive advantages inherent in the technology, the management, the 
organization of labor, and the vertical integration of key suppliers of 
intermediate inputs to the finished product as primary explanations of 
foreign direct investment. In effect, an imperfect market for informa 
tion about production and organization and first-mover advantages into 
markets with products that have increasing returns to scale cost struc 
tures give some firms a competitive advantage that may last for a con 
siderable period of time. The advantage means the foreign firms will 
outbid domestic firms for land and plants in an industry.
For some time, it seems U.S. firms enjoyed a competitive advantage 
over foreign firms, and U.S. firms invested heavily overseas. Recently, 
the competitive advantage in some industries may have shifted to firms 
headquartered in certain other countries, and those firms have invested 
heavily in the United States.
Added to the inherent competitive advantages that underlie much of 
the industrial organization theory of foreign firms' investment in cer 
tain industries may be a layer of U.S. tariffs or quotas aimed at protect 
ing domestic firms from international trade in these same industries. 
Ironically, the tariffs or quotas give foreign firms with competitive 
advantages further incentive to invest in the United States to exploit 
the competitive advantage and to circumvent the tariff or quota.
How Mobile is Foreign Capital?
Attracting foreign investors could be viewed as a bright spot in our 
economy. The fact that foreigners invest in the United States as well as 
at home means that they are optimistic about the long-term prospects 
for the United States economy. Foreign investment might promote pro 
ductivity increases without increased domestic saving. The productiv 
ity increase will lead to higher real wages for workers in the United 
States, although foreign ownership of capital means that the capital
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earnings will accrue to persons external to the United States. With for 
eign investment fueling our productivity surge, we will begin to 
become a nation of workers and not capitalists.
For some time, however, economists have thought that there is an 
important link between the amount of domestic saving in an economy 
and the amount of total investment in the economy. The explicit link 
between domestic saving and investment leaves little room for foreign 
investment to play a significant investment role in the economic 
growth of a country. The linkage between domestic saving and invest 
ment not only relegates foreign investment to a minor role in the econ 
omy, it also suggests that capital is relatively immobile among 
countries. Overall, if capital is immobile across countries, the large 
inward flow of capital to the United States during the 1980s may be an 
aberration and may not be available in the future for sustaining our 
economic growth. More to the point of this study, if capital is immo 
bile, states may find foreign investment less available and more diffi 
cult to attract in future years.
A long list of studies beginning with Feldstein and Horioka (1980) 
have examined the extent of international capital flows or the strength 
in the linkage between domestic saving and investment. Feldstein and 
Horioka (1980) list three reasons why international capital may not 
flow perfectly among countries, and why domestic saving tends to be 
invested in the home country for investment. First, there are additional 
uncertainties and risks associated with investments in other countries, 
such as exchange rate risk when large liabilities or profits are denomi 
nated in dollars. Second, investors may be wary of existing or future 
export controls imposed by the host countries or increases in host 
country tax policy on foreign investment. Finally, there are institu 
tional rigidities in countries that hinder foreign investment. Feldstein 
and Horioka indeed found evidence that domestic saving and aggre 
gate investment were strongly related, or implicitly that international 
capital was relatively immobile in their sample of 21 Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries during the 
1960 to 1974 period.
Several other researchers have extended the Feldstein and Horioka 
results to other countries and tested the hypothesis using data for more 
recent years. Dooley, Frankel, and Mathieson (1987) examined the 
saving-investment link in 14 industrialized countries and 48 develop-
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ing countries. Reasoning that exchange rates may affect capital mobil 
ity, they tested their model for the Bretton Woods era of fixed exchange 
rates, 1960 to 1973, and the post-Bretton Woods era from 1974 to 
1984. They also found a statistically robust relationship between 
domestic saving and aggregate investment in both exchange rate 
regimes.
Even so, large current account (export minus import) imbalances in 
many countries during the 1980s require counterbalancing capital 
flows among countries. That being the case, the empirical findings that 
domestic saving is the strongest and almost the exclusive predictor of 
investment in a country are inconsistent with the counterbalancing cap 
ital flows predicted by theory. Obstfeld (1986) and other critics attempt 
to resolve the inconsistency by arguing that spurious correlation exists 
between domestic saving and investment, and that the Feldstein-Hori- 
oka results are based on spurious correlation and therefore incorrect. 
The spurious correlation between saving and investment could result, 
for example, when saving and investment are in fact related to a com 
mon variable, such as Gross Domestic Product.
Responding to the spurious correlation criticism, Feldstein and Bac- 
chetta (1991) have recently updated the Feldstein and Horioka work by 
re-estimating the models to account for the possibility of spurious cor 
relation and by using data covering the 1960 through 1986 period.8 
While the general result remains that savings tend to stay at home, 
their results from the 1980s reveal a somewhat weakened link between 
domestic saving and aggregate investment. In addition, Feldstein and 
Bacchetta find that capital moves more freely among the countries in 
the European Economic Community with their strong economic link 
ages than it does among nations in the rest of the world. Nonetheless, 
the findings suggest an unusually strong link between domestic saving 
and aggregate investment; the link is certainly much stronger than 
would be expected in a perfectly integrated capital market.
Empirical findings of domestic saving determining investment give 
rise to theories about and tests of capital market integration or the 
degree of capital mobility among countries (Frankel 1992). Given that 
there are saving and investment imbalances and current account imbal 
ances among countries, imperfect capital mobility among countries 
would mean that the real returns to capital differ among countries. Put 
another way, when domestic saving and investment imbalances exist
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among countries, perfect capital mobility among countries could lead 
to equal (covered) real returns to capital among countries.
For example, Frankel suggests that real returns to capital measured 
in terms of covered-interest rates should be equal among countries if 
capital is perfectly mobile among countries. Covered-interest parity 
accounts for differences in real interest rates among countries, for 
expected changes in real interest rates, for expected changes in real 
exchange rates between the currencies, and for a risk premium for real 
exchange rate risk.9 The evidence shows that covered-interest rate dif 
ferentials between the United States and other countries are at or very 
near zero during each year of the 1974 to 1992 period. Put more 
directly, the evidence suggests that capital markets are operating near 
perfectly to equalize covered-interest rates. That evidence casts doubt 
on the Feldstein-Horioka results. However, Frankel also notes that the 
United Kingdom and Japan as recently as 1979, and France and Italy 
as recently as 1986, had capital controls and other barriers to the move 
ment of their capital to other nations. Nonetheless, the movement of 
capital seems less restricted now in the absence of the financial con 
trols, even if the controls once dampened world capital movements. 
The evidence at present points to significant international capital 
mobility and to a potentially significant role for foreign capital in the 
economic growth of nations.
Direct Taxation and Foreign Investment: Principles and Practice
Given a significant degree of, if not perfect, capital mobility, capital 
movements and direct investment may be expected to respond to tax 
differentials among countries. While foreign investors are unlikely to 
base their investment decision solely on taxation, especially in light of 
the role of industrial organization considerations in the investment 
decision, taxation can in some cases play a decisive role in the location 
of the investment. If, for example, investors have already decided to 
invest abroad, then federal, state, and local taxation policies can influ 
ence where they invest and whether they raise the investment funds 
through debt or equity. The research reported in this volume concerns, 
in part, the role that state fiscal policy plays in the location of FDI 
within the United States.
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Before we describe the taxation of foreign investors, it is useful to 
describe the normative implications of several tax positions that busi 
ness leaders or policymakers take in regard to the taxation of interna 
tional capital. To that end we begin with a normative discussion of the 
economic welfare implications of typical tax regimes that are applied 
toward foreign investors, because different tax regimes can raise or 
lower output in the world or in a country. We then focus more specifi 
cally on the tax systems that apply to major foreign investors in the 
United States.
Economic Welfare Implications of Tax Regimes 
Applied to Foreign Investors
A tax principle that economic policymakers and business people 
often advocate is a "level playing field." However, that term often has a 
different meaning for economists than for business people. Economists 
approach tax policy from an economic welfare perspective or the effi 
cient allocation of capital, which implies maximizing output and, thus, 
the return to capital. However, output maximization can be done from 
a worldwide viewpoint or from a single-nation viewpoint. Those with a 
world view of output maximization would start with the notion that 
taxation should not distort the allocation of capital investment across 
countries, nor should it reduce the level of overall investment in the 
world. That being the case, maximizing world economic welfare 
means that managers make the same location and investment decisions 
with a tax system as they would in the absence of a tax system.
Worldwide Neutrality
Tax systems designed to achieve the maximization of world output 
and return to capital are referred to as "capital-export neutral" (CEN). 
Using a residence-based tax system, the home country generally taxes 
foreign income at home country rates and grants a tax credit for taxes 
paid in the host country. In many cases, the home country imposes 
taxes on foreign income only when it is repatriated to the home country 
(with deferral).
To achieve CEN, tax policy designers would insure that the mar 
ginal effective tax rates are zero both for international investments (or 
exported capital) and for home country investments. Capital income
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would still be taxed; a positive amount of tax would be paid on eco 
nomic rents (returns above the marginal or normal rate of return) 
earned on inframarginal capital investments. To the extent that eco 
nomic rents on capital differ among countries, average tax rates on 
inframarginal capital would still vary among investments within the 
home country and between investments in the home and the host coun 
tries (Caves 1982).
To reach a zero marginal effective tax rate and a completely neutral 
tax system for capital, for example, McLure (1992) proposes using a 
consumption-based corporate income tax. Using a residence-based tax 
system, the home country would tax corporate income earned in a for 
eign country (without deferral) and grant credits to foreign firms 
against home country tax liabilities for taxes paid to foreign govern 
ments. A zero effective marginal tax rate occurs if investment in plant 
and equipment in foreign operations as well as in domestic operations 
is expensed against corporate income rather than depreciated. Invest 
ment expensing or immediate write-off of foreign and domestic invest 
ment implies an efficient allocation of capital across countries as well 
as an efficient level of investment. 10
Two other tax methods would achieve CEN in the allocation of cap 
ital across countries; however, because the marginal effective tax rate 
is not zero, each method reduces the level of investment in the world. 
One approach exempts capital from taxation in the host country, while 
the home country would tax the capital income. In this case, the need 
for the tax credit in the home country for foreign taxes paid is elimi 
nated. As capital income is not taxed by host countries, capital invest 
ment at home and abroad is taxed at the same rate, or CEN is achieved. 
Under a second tax method, the home country taxes corporate affiliates 
in other countries (with no income deferral) but allows a full tax credit 
for taxes paid to the host country. Both tax methods would neutralize 
taxation as a determinant of location; however, without investment 
expensing neither guarantees that the marginal effective tax rates are 
zero. A nonzero marginal tax rate depresses the level of world invest 
ment even if the tax system does not affect the relative location of cap 
ital investment.
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A National Focus for Maximization
National policymakers are more typically concerned with maximiz 
ing national income (private income plus government revenue) from 
capital rather than worldwide income from capital. In this scenario, 
when marginal effective tax rates are greater than zero, policymakers 
would implement tax policy designed to keep capital at home until its 
gross return (including taxes) at home equaled its after-tax return in 
other countries. Under those conditions, the home country's income 
maximization would include the sum of the private returns to investors 
and the home government's revenue. To achieve national income max 
imization, foreign taxes paid are deducted from the firm's total foreign 
income and the home country tax rate is applied to the capital income 
net of foreign taxes. 11 (Figure 1.2 contains a summary of the economic 
welfare effects of residence-based tax systems.)
A Third Viewpoint
Business leaders hold a third view of a "level playing field." They 
consider neither worldwide nor national capital income maximization 
principles. Instead, they generally feel that "foreign plants" operating 
in the United States, for example, should pay the same tax rate as 
domestic plants operating in the United States. Foreign operations pay 
ing lower taxes than domestic plants are viewed as receiving a subsidy 
compared to counterpart domestic plants. That being the case, business 
leaders would favor territorial tax systems, under which the foreign 
investors pay the taxes of the host country with no home country taxa 
tion of foreign capital. Such a system is known as "capital-import neu 
tral," as foreigners investing in the host country pay the same tax rates 
as domestic investors. A territorial tax system has no particular norma 
tive economic welfare implications. However, territorial tax systems 
can be "capital-export neutral," if the marginal effective tax rates are 
uniform across countries, or, for example, if all countries operate a ter 
ritorial tax system and allow the expensing of investment in plant and 
equipment in the calculation of taxable income.
18 Introduction
Figure 1.2 Economic Implications of Hypothetical Residence-Based Tax 
Systems
Foreign investors pay 
home country tax rate 
with a credit for foreign 
taxes paid and:
Investment at home and 
abroad is expensed
Investment at home and 
abroad is not expensed
Foreign investors pay 
home country tax rate 
with a deduction for 





























Hufbauer (1992) suggests an alternative to the traditional thinking 
about the influence of taxation on the mobility of capital across coun 
tries. He notes, as discussed above, that modern international trade the 
ory places industrial-organization reasons ahead of tax policies as a 
motivation for multinational investment decisions. Stated in its pure 
form, imperfectly competitive firms choose locations based purely on 
market advantages. Location decisions based on industrial-organiza 
tion considerations would significantly blunt the welfare implications 
of CEN as direct foreign investment is not responsive to taxation. 12
Hufbauer's view of the motivations for the investment decisions of 
multinational firms allows him to argue for a territorial tax system in 
which the United States, for example, develops tax policies designed to 
capture a greater share of desirable foreign investments. He suggests 
that corporate tax credits for a generous portion of research and devel 
opment expenses for both domestic and foreign firms might induce 
more high-technology firms, which tend to pay higher wages, to 
expand in the United States. 13 Such a tax system, however, might stir 
international competition in tax systems to attract firms. Nonetheless, 
given that business generally favors a territorial tax system, domestic
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business competitors would perceive Hufbauer's strategic tax policy as 
a "fair" method of taxation.
The examples of foreign tax systems leave many choices for policy- 
makers. However, the taxation of foreign corporations is in fact much 
more complex than even the stylized examples noted above. The maze 
of complexities presently in any country's tax system means that a tax 
system will not easily be categorized as capital-export or capital- 
import neutral. Uncovering the role that taxation may play in the 
mobility of capital across countries requires substantial knowledge of 
tax systems. The brief overview provided below of the tax practices as 
they apply to major investors in the United States will lead to more 
precise formulations of empirical models of the tax systems and to 
more exact interpretations of our empirical results.
Tax Practices That Apply to Foreign Corporations
Most countries operate either a residence-based or a territorial tax 
system, although some countries use a combination of these two 
approaches. 14 The residence-based system is typical for most countries, 
including Japan, The United Kingdom and the United States. In coun 
tries operating a residence-based system, the foreign corporation is lia 
ble for host country taxes annually and for home country taxes when 
profits are repatriated to the parent corporation in the home country. 
Upon repatriation of net of foreign tax earnings to the home country, 
the home country statutory tax rate is applied to gross earnings (net 
earnings plus foreign taxes paid) and a tax credit is applied against the 
home country tax liability for taxes paid to the foreign country. 15 In 
practice, the tax credit is limited to the amount of home country tax lia 
bility. When the foreign tax liability is higher than the home country 
tax liability, the firm is in an excess credit position and essentially pays 
the foreign tax rate on its earnings.
For example, consider a U.S. corporation that locates a subsidiary in 
another country and retains the earnings within the subsidiary for some 
time. The foreign corporation would always pay taxes to the host coun 
try. In effect, if the corporation never repatriated the earnings to the 
United States, it would never pay U.S. taxes. However, if the corpora 
tion repatriates the earnings to the United States, the profits are then 
taxed at corporate rates in the United States. To avoid double taxation
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of the profits in the host and the home countries, the United States has 
established tax treaties with countries. The United States allows a tax 
credit for the foreign taxes paid up to the tax liability that would have 
been due in the United States. 16 Thus, if the host country taxes are 
higher than the home country taxes, the corporation pays no tax to the 
home country after applying the tax credit; the host country tax rates 
are effectively the tax rates for the corporation. If, on the other hand, 
the home country taxes are higher than the host country taxes, the cor 
poration effectively pays the home country tax.
As explained above, the former situation amounts to a territorial tax 
system or capital-import neutrality. The latter case appears to be CEN 
(but see below), because capital that stayed within the United States 
and capital that moved overseas are both taxed at home country tax 
rates. Under CEN, it is worth reiterating, the incentive to invest over 
seas is governed by the rates of return to capital invested domestically 
compared to the rates of return to capital invested overseas. The tax 
system plays a neutral role.
Several countries, notably Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and 
Norway, operate a territorial tax system. Under that system, residents 
who invest in other countries are subject to the tax liabilities of the host 
country. The profits are never taxed in the home country. 17 A home 
country that operates a territorial tax system provides obvious incen 
tives for residents to seek investment locations in host countries with 
lower tax rates.
To complicate matters, Canada and West Germany operate a mixed 
tax system for foreign investments. 18 Canada, for example, applies a 
residence-based tax system to foreign income with tax credits for for 
eign taxes paid. However, dividends earned in foreign corporations and 
repatriated to Canadian parent companies are not subject to Canadian 
(home) country taxes. Thus, for example, a Canadian subsidiary oper 
ating in the United States would pay home country taxes with a credit 
for taxes paid in the United States. However, Canada would not tax 
dividend income returned to the parent nor would it grant a tax credit 
for U.S. taxes paid on the dividend income. 19
Beyond the aforementioned economic welfare implications of vari 
ous tax policies, whether countries follow capital-export neutrality or 
capital-import neutrality determines whether home or host country tax 
rates are relevant for empirical work on the location decisions of for-
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eign investment. To be more specific, United States federal and state 
corporate income tax rates can make a difference in the location choice 
of foreign investors in the United States only if U.S. (host country) 
taxes represent the marginal taxes on the investment. However, the fol 
lowing sections will argue that determining a priori whether foreign 
taxes are neutral in either an export or import sense is probably not 
possible.
Residence-Based Tax Systems, Deferral, 
and Capital-Import Neutrality
The literature on foreign taxation has until recently maintained that 
residence-based tax systems combined with a credit for taxes paid to 
foreign countries would produce capital-export neutrality. However, 
when tax deferral, or payment of home country taxes only upon repa 
triation of profits from foreign corporations, is layered onto the system, 
some argue that the tax system is no longer capital-export neutral 
(Caves 1982). 20 Hartman's (1985) analysis shows that residence-based 
tax systems with tax deferral until repatriation and tax credits for taxes 
paid to foreign governments are capital-import neutral rather than cap 
ital-export neutral. Hartman's analysis then implies that host country 
taxes could become a significant determinant of its inward foreign 
direct investment. (See appendix to this chapter for details on Hart 
man's argument.)
Additional Complexities
Since Hartman's paper, a number of authors have examined other 
aspects of the taxation of foreign direct investment. 21 The relatively 
straightforward tax systems presented so far have many additional 
complications. For example, host countries levy additional withhold 
ing taxes on dividends before they are repatriated to the home corpora 
tion. The withholding tax qualifies for the foreign tax credit in the 
home country. However, as the total amount of tax credit is limited to 
the total tax that would be due in the home country, the withholding tax 
can put the corporation into an excess credit position, meaning that it 
cannot use all of the tax credit.
The withholding tax and the possibility of excess credits may in turn 
alter corporate financial behavior. For example, instead of paying a 
dividend to the parent, the foreign corporation could pay interest on a
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loan from the parent. That strategy reduces the overall tax paid, as the 
interest payment is not subject to withholding tax and is also deduct 
ible from most corporate income tax bases in host countries. Thus, the 
interest tax payment is subject to only the home country tax rate.
There are several additional complications. Using transfer pricing, 
foreign corporations minimize aggregate tax burdens by transferring 
costs to the highest tax countries, or the corporations effectively realize 
profits or income in the lowest tax countries. There are also other limi 
tations on credits for foreign taxes paid, such as the tax credit baskets 
defined in the 1986 U.S. Tax Reform Act. The baskets add further lay 
ers of intricacy to the system and help to make, a priori, the effect of 
taxes on foreign direct investment unpredictable. In such a complex 
system, empirical evidence can make an important contribution to our 
understanding of the role of taxation in FDI flows.
Given the different tax treatments on FDI among the four countries 
with the most investments in the United States, U.S. federal and state 
corporate income taxes are more likely to affect investment from the 
Netherlands and Canada with their territorial systems. There is more 
uncertainty about the importance of U.S. taxes on investors from Japan 
and the United Kingdom, which operate residence-based tax systems. 
Thus, in the empirical research presented later in this study, we distin 
guish between investors from countries with different treatments of 
taxes paid in the United States.
The Role of State Corporate Tax Systems
State tax systems introduce more layers of taxation on foreign 
source income and foreign investment. State corporate tax systems are 
by their nature complicated systems when corporations are active in 
more than one state. A host of complications are added to the system 
when corporations operate in more than one country.
To begin, corporate income taxes generally differ among states in 
the tax rates and the deductions and credits that determine taxable cor 
porate income and tax liability. For example, corporations wholly resi 
dent within a state have their total corporate income after deductions 
subject to taxation. Corporations that operate affiliates in other states or 
in other countries can have a portion of their affiliates' income subject 
to taxation in the state. How much affiliated income is taxed in a state
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depends on the state's definition of an affiliate and on its formula to 
apportion corporate income to the state.
To explain more fully, general accounting practice would encourage 
corporations to report the corporate income separately for each of their 
affiliates, taking into account transfers among affiliates. Some states 
adopt separate accounting of corporate income for tax purposes, and 
corporations in these states are allowed to report taxable corporate 
income based on separate accounting of corporate income. However, 
because of the potential for corporations to avoid taxation in high-tax 
states through a system of transfer prices applied to commodity 
exchanges among affiliates, many states start with a broad definition of 
corporate affiliate income and then use a three-factor formula (the 
Massachusetts formula or its variants) to allocate a portion of the com 
bined income to itself. Typically the amount of combined income allo 
cated to a particular state is based on the share of combined payroll, 
sales, and property that resides in the state compared to the combined 
total payroll, sales, and property of the affiliates. The allocated income 
is then subject to the state's tax system.
States' definitions of an affiliated company differ substantially and, 
thus, corporate tax liabilities can depend heavily on the definition used 
to combine affiliates. For example, several states operate a unitary tax 
system in that they have a more spatially expansive definition of the 
corporation and its affiliates, resulting in higher corporate income 
attributable to the state. 22 The unitary states generally define a unitary 
business to include other corporate operations that contribute to the 
business conducted in the corporate group and that have 50 percent or 
more common ownership or control between the corporation located in 
the state and the corporate group. The group would then file a com 
bined return for the state corporate income tax and use the three-factor 
allocation formula mentioned above (or a variant of it) to determine the 
proportion of the group income that is taxable in the state.
In fact, the unitary states operate one of two types of unitary tax sys 
tems—worldwide and domestic—with domestic being a less expan 
sive definition of the corporation than worldwide. Under a worldwide 
unitary regime, any business located in the state would combine the 
income from worldwide affiliates fitting the definitions of a unitary 
business noted above. The worldwide definition includes in the appor- 
tionable tax base the foreign and domestic affiliates regardless of the
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place of incorporation, including the foreign parent and its foreign 
affiliates. Under a domestic unitary regime, the apportionable base 
includes both foreign and domestic affiliates of businesses incorpo 
rated in the United States, regardless of where they do business. 23
During the period of our analysis, a considerable portion of states 
operated a worldwide unitary tax system. But the frequency of the 
worldwide unitary tax shrank from thirteen states in the early 1980s to 
five states by the end of our sample period or 1987. We account for this 
extreme form of unitary taxation in our empirical work. 24
Other Taxes and Expenditures
International corporations and their employees face the same indi 
rect taxes in host countries as do the domestic corporations in the host 
country. Thus, our full specification of the fiscal variables will account 
for sales, property, excise, and other taxes in our empirical models. 
Personal income taxes, while they are direct taxes, may also influence 
corporate location decisions to the extent that these taxes affect the 
type and number of employees in the labor supply. Personal income 
taxes will also be accounted for in the empirical work.
The expenditure side of state and local tax systems may also play a 
role in foreign corporations' choice of state. The sizable investments 
mean a substantial number of employees will consume schools, parks, 
highways, and other public goods. Higher taxes by themselves may not 
play a major role in location if the taxes purchase a desirable bundle of 
state and local goods and services. Thus, our empirical work will 
account for both the spending and revenue sides of state and local bud 
gets.
Summary
We have examined the broader issues related to foreign investment. 
Our debtor nation status results from our negative portfolio investment 
position, although our surplus position in FDI continues to shrink. We 
highlighted the advantages of attracting foreign investment, as it adds 
to the productivity of our economy and in the shorter-run allows us to 
increase our consumption temporarily and stall repayment of our defi 
cit.
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Despite the size of the investment positions in foreign countries, 
researchers have raised questions about the long-term mobility of 
international capital. By examining patterns of domestic saving and 
investment, capital mobility among countries appears imperfect, sug 
gesting that domestic saving will determine national economic growth. 
Using an alternative approach to the issue, Frankel finds that the equal 
ity of covered-interest rates across countries suggests perfect capital 
mobility among countries.
The tax policy discussion suggests a variety of approaches to the 
taxation of international capital, and enumerates the variety of methods 
that countries actually use. The complicated tax systems actually 
deployed suggest that there may be significant tax incentives affecting 
the location of foreign direct investment. Others might contend that the 
complications of the system, such as of transfer pricing and tax defer 
ral, allow corporations to engage in significant tax avoidance; taxes, 
therefore, affect their financial practices but do not affect their location 
decisions on foreign investments. Exactly how tax policy affects the 
movement of international capital or whether we want to affect its 
movement with tax policy is not well understood. With all the com 
plexities involved in taxation of foreign income and the opportunities 
available to firms to adjust their tax burdens by altering their financial 
policies, it seems unlikely that taxation would overtly play a significant 
role in FDI decisions.
We restrict our empirical inquiry to FDI location choices within the 
United States. The variation in state tax rates may have only second- 
order implications for FDI location among the states, given the com 
plexities that apply at national government levels. Nonetheless, even if 
nontax factors govern inter-country FDI decisions, the effects of state 
and local fiscal policy may influence intra-country FDI locations 
among states.
Our Research: Direct Investment in New Plants
As is clear from above, foreign investment stems from many differ 
ent sources and takes a number of different forms. For example, before 
making an investment, a foreign investor can choose from a wide array
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of alternative investments at home and abroad. If the investor recog 
nizes a market opportunity in the United States, he or she considers 
how best to compete in that market. The options include exporting out 
put to the United States, purchasing a portion or all of an existing com 
pany in the United States, engaging in a joint venture with a U.S. 
investor, expanding an existing production facility, or building a new 
plant.
In the rest of this book, we use data from the International Trade 
Administration (ITA) to analyze the location of new foreign plants 
between 1979 and 1987, the last year the data are available. The ITA 
data for foreign investments report the number of new plants, acquisi 
tions and mergers, joint ventures, equity increases, and plant expan 
sions. The agency gathers the data from newspaper and journal 
announcements and from reports from other federal agencies. Once 
compiled, no attempt is made to determine whether the investment 
actually occurred. While the ITA data may not be quite as reliable as 
the mandatory reports on United States investments that foreign firms 
file with the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), the BEAdata do not 
contain information on new plants. The ITA, however, reports that 
their information on foreign direct investments is consistent with the 
BEA data. Despite that claim, Glickman and Woodward (1989) 
express some reservations about the ITA data, but acknowledge that it 
is the only data on new plant investment in the United States.
Indeed, we share their reservations about the ITA data, because no 
verification is done on whether the reported investment announce 
ments actually materialized. However, while acknowledging the short 
comings of the data, we believe they are generally accurate.
The International Trade Administration data reveal that most foreign 
direct investments take the form of either an acquisition or expansion 
of an existing plant. Equity increases and corporate buyouts of existing 
companies may create jobs through managerial efficiencies or revival 
of moribund plants, but those employment benefits are less noticeable 
to policymakers and the public. We choose to examine the location of 
new plants with the idea that the so called "greenfield investments" 
(new plants) might be the most interesting for policymakers.
From a discovery perspective, a greenfield investment, compared to 
an acquisition or a joint venture, allows the investor almost complete 
freedom to select a new plant site and to choose among sites within the
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United States. Thus, examining new plant locations has the advantage 
of giving us the most insight into the location factors that attract for 
eign investors.
To focus the discussion in the next chapters, using data from Inter 
national Trade Administration of the Department of Commerce, there 
were 4,326 direct non-real-estate investments in manufacturing during 
the 1978 to 1987 period. The largest share of the investments were 
acquisitions and mergers followed by new plants and then plant expan 
sions (see table 1.3). There were 1,396 new foreign plant locations in 
the United States between 1978 and 1987, and 1,197 of the plants were 
in manufacturing. 25 We examine the data on the 1,197 manufacturing 
locations and attempt to explain the choice of investors among the 48 
continental states.
The International Trade Administration data suggest that investors 
from Japan were responsible for 34 percent of the new foreign plants 
located in the United States between 1978 and 1987 (see table 1.4). 
Investors from Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom accounted 
for an additional 40 percent of new foreign manufacturing plants in the 
United States between 1978 and 1987. Investors from France, Switzer 
land and the Netherlands accounted for another 14 percent of the new 
foreign manufacturing plants in the United States.
Also shown in table 1.4 is the distribution of the new plant invest 
ments by two-digit SIC code within the manufacturing sector. Of the 
1,197 new manufacturing plants for the 1978 to 1987 period, 57 per 
cent are concentrated in four industry groups; namely, Chemicals and 
Allied Products, Industrial Machinery and Equipment, Electronic and 
Other Electric Equipment and Transportation Equipment. 26 At the other 
extreme, there were no new plants in Tobacco Products, Apparel, and 
Other Textile Products; and Leather and Leather Products each had 
only five new foreign plants during the 10-year period. The balance of 
the new plants were distributed more evenly throughout the remaining 
13 two-digit manufacturing industries (see figure 1.3).
The concentration of new manufacturing plants in four industry 
groups holds when new plant investments are examined by country. 
Canada investors 'have 46 percent of their number of new manufactur 
ing plants in the same four industry groups noted above, and German 
investors have 67 percent of their new plants in those same four indus-






































































































SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration (various issues). 
NOTE: These data represent investments with complete informadon on the transaction site. There are some transactions for which no location informa 
tion are available. The transactions are relatively few in number.
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SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, various issues.
Introduction 31
try groups. Japan and the United Kingdom have similarly large propor 
tions of their new manufacturing plants in those four industry groups.
Foreign New Plants Compared Against America©s 
Industrial Structure
The concentration of new foreign plants in four major industry 
groups might be expected if one could compare them to the major 
group concentrations of new plants built by domestic investors. With 
no access to data on new domestic manufacturing plants, we compared 
the industrial concentrations of new foreign manufacturing plants dur 
ing the 1978 to 1987 period to the stock of assets in each major manu 
facturing group (see table 1.5) for all foreign firms and all businesses 
located in the United States in 1987. Four major groups, Chemicals 
and Allied Products, Petroleum and Coal, Food and Kindred Products, 
and Electric and Electronic Equipment, account for about 66 percent of 
total foreign assets in manufacturing. For all businesses, assets in six 
industries, Petroleum and Coal, Transportation Equipment, Chemicals 
and Allied Products, Food and Kindred Products, Machinery Except 
Electrical, and Electric and Electronic Equipment, account for 70 per 
cent of assets in manufacturing. With the exceptions of Petroleum and 
Coal and Food and Kindred Products, new foreign plants are con 
structed in four of the major manufacturing groups that dominate the 
manufacturing assets held in the United States (see figure 1.4). Thus, 
based on asset data, we conclude that new foreign manufacturing 
plants are built in major industry groups where investments are already 
concentrated.
Outline of the Monograph
In chapter 2 of the book, we examine the patterns of new plant loca 
tions within the United States. We then examine the empirical evidence 
on the location of foreign direct investment among countries and what 
role taxes and other factors play in the foreign investors' decision. 
Next, we summarize the literature on the location choices that foreign 
investors make among states.
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Figure 1.3 New Manufacturing Plants by Industry
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Figure 1.4 Assets of Manufacturing and New Foreign Plants, Six Major 
Industry Groups




Table 1.5 Total Assets of U.S. Affiliates, All U.S. Businesses, and New 
Manufacturing Plants, 1987
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SOURCES: Howenstine (1989); and U.S. Department 
Administration (various issues).
of Commerce, International Trade
In the third chapter, we discuss how to model the location decision. 
There are numerous theoretical and econometric choices about model 
ing the location decision, and we discuss the background behind them. 
We also lay out the econometric models that we use. In chapter 4, we 
discuss the econometric estimation and present the results of the esti 
mation. A fifth chapter contains some of the policy implications of this 
research that flow from the simulation results reported there. Chapter 6 
summarizes our findings and reports the conclusions from this 
research.
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Appendix to Chapter 1
To understand Hartman's (1985) analysis and conclusion that residence- 
based tax systems are capital-import neutral, it is helpful to distinguish 
between mature and immature foreign corporations. Mature foreign corpora 
tions fund their own reinvestment out of retained earnings, while immature 
corporations require transfers from the domestic parent to finance their invest 
ment. Hartman's conclusion applies to mature corporations only. His conclu 
sions also require the full offset of foreign direct taxes against home country 
taxes. The implication is that home country tax rates are higher than host 
country tax rates.
Hartman first shows that mature corporations with unexploited investment 
opportunities in the host country would not simultaneously receive transfers 
from the parent to finance investments, while making dividend payments to 
the parent. This feature greatly simplifies the analysis, and the income of 
mature firms flows only in one direction. Hartman then examines the mature 
firm's decision either to return dividends to the parent for investment in the 
home country or to invest in the host country. If the firm returns a $1 dividend 
net of foreign taxes to the parent immediately, the dividends are incremented 
by the foreign taxes deemed paid on the dividends, or by 1/(1 - f*), where t* is 
the foreign tax rate and is assumed less than the home country tax rate of t. 
After paying the home country tax and accounting for the tax credit for for 
eign taxes already paid in the host country, the corporation pays a total tax rate 
of t—the domestic tax rate—on the gross earnings. Thus, the corporation has 
[(1 - 0/0 - /*)] to invest at home. The net return to the repatriated profit at the 
end of the next period is [(1 - 0/0 - f *)]0+f/i)» where t is the domestic tax rate 
and rn is the net rate of return to investment in the home country.
On the other hand, the firm can retain foreign earnings in the host country 
for one year and repatriate the profits after a second year. In this case, the net 
profit is [(1 - 0/0 - f*)] [1 + r*(l - /*)], where r* indicates the rate of return on 
investment in the host country. Comparing the rates of return for home and 
host country investments, the firm will return dividends if the after-tax rate of 
return is higher in the home country (/•„) than the after-tax rate of return in the 
host country [r*(l -t*)]. Thus, the net rate of return on investment and not the 
tax due upon repatriation affects the decision to reinvest.
The important conclusion from Hartman's analysis is that there is capital- 
import neutrality (not capital-export neutrality) as a result of the tax credit and 
deferment, because the firm's investment abroad is determined by the rate of 
return in the host country as is the domestic investment in the host country.27
NOTES
1. Unless otherwise noted, foreign investment refers to inward foreign investment or invest 
ment in the United States. In the few instances when we discuss investment flows from the United 
States to other countries, we use the term outward investment
2. The period of analysis is dictated by data availability. The source of the data is the U.S. 
Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration. While similar data on individual 
plant locations are also available for the 1972 to 1977 period, it is our feeling, after examining the 
data quite thoroughly, that the data before 1978 have many more problems with missing values 
and other discrepancies than the post-1977 data.
3. For a discussion of the Department of Commerce's definition of foreign investment as dis 
tinguished from investment in plant and equipment, see Slemrod (1989).
4. Investment is defined as the flow of capital typically during a one-year period. Investment 
position is the stock of investment at a point in time.
5. Current-cost reflects the replacement cost of the capital stock after accounting for depreci 
ation, depletion, and expensed exploration and development costs. Market value reflects valuation 
of capital stock based on valuation in the stock and bond markets. The valuation could be subject 
to short-term changes in valuation of stocks or bonds and year-to-year changes in market value 
may not reflect accurately investment flows. For more detail see Scholl, Mataloni, and Bezirga- 
nian (1992) and references therein.
6. Furthermore, the U.S. Department of Commerce data on foreign investment includes only 
four benchmark or complete survey years: 1959, 1974, 1980 and 1987. Foreign investment data 
for interim years are based on sample data from quarterly surveys and extrapolations from the 
benchmark survey years. The data thus calculated are never revised when new benchmark results 
are tabulated. (Slemrod 1989 and Glickman and Woodward 1989 (pp. 303-308) also note these 
limitations in the foreign investment data.)
7. We examine aggregate trends in foreign investment, using the U.S. Department of Com 
merce, Bureau of Economic Analysis data. The micro data in their raw form from the U.S. Depart 
ment of Commerce, International Trade Administration, are not necessarily an accurate 
description of aggregate totals.
8. Feldstein and Bacchetta (1991) address the Obstfeld objection by adding economic growth 
and distribution variables to their savings-investment retention equation. They find that the 
growth argument does not diminish the strength of the relationship between domestic saying and 
investment. Williamson (1991), however, casts doubt on the relationship, arguing that domestic 
saving and investment are not strongly correlated. Therefore, the marginal flows of international 
capital could play a critical role in a country's capital accumulation leading to more economic pro 
ductivity. A separate issue is the effect of saving and investment on productivity growth in an 
economy. Baumol, Blackman, and Wolff (1989) accept the view that productivity growth leads to 
saving and investment rather than saving and investment fostering productivity.
9. Covered-interest parity means that capital flows would equalize interest rates across coun 
tries when similar investments in the two countries are contracted in the same currency. For exam 
ple, suppose a dollar-based investor contracted a three-month dollar denominated deposit and a 
three-month German mark denominated deposit together with a three-month forward contract to 
change German marks into dollars. As both investments are contracted in a common currency and 
the yields are known in advance, covered-interest parity simply means that the two investments 
yield the same return. This example is taken from The Economist (1992).
10.Note that CEN could also be achieved under a territorial tax system if all host countries 
allowed investment expensing.
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11.The deduction of foreign taxes paid from income before calculating home country taxes 
due leads to gross returns to domestic country investment equal to net of tax returns for foreign 
country investment. For example, a home country domestic investor would receive after-tax 
income of rd - td r^ where rd is the gross return to a dollar of domestic investment and td is the 
domestic tax rate. With deducibility for foreign taxes paid, a foreign investor would receive after- 
domestic-and-foreign-tax income of tf- td (TJ- tf r^ - tf rp where /yis the gross return to foreign 
investment and I,is the tax rate in the foreign country.
Investors would maximize capital income when they equate the after-tax rates of return in 
both countries or when (1 - tj) rd = (1 -1 J TJ - (1 - tj) tf rj<x rd = TJ - tf ff The latter condition 
implies that the tax deduction for foreign taxes leads investors to equate the gross return on 
domestic investment to the net of tax return on foreign investment. For more discussion of taxa 
tion of foreign capital as well as its welfare implications, see All worth (1988).
12.Hufbauer (1992) suggests maintaining residence-based taxation for foreign portfolio 
investment, as returns to capital more likely influence portfolio capital flows among countries.
13.Reich (1990) makes a similar case about firm location among countries and argues that 
industrial policy in the United States might be used to attract high-tech firms.
14.This discussion of residential and territorial tax systems is based in part on Slemrod 
(1989).
15.The United States tax code does not extend depreciation and investment tax credits to for 
eign firms when profits are repatriated to the United States. Thus, foreign corporations, held by 
U.S. investors, pay the statutory corporate income tax rate (see Gordon and Jun 1992).
16.The United States has operated a foreign tax credit system since 1921. The foreign tax 
credit can take two forms: a credit for the total taxes paid to foreign governments or a credit given 
for each country in which the corporation has an investment. There may be certain investment 
advantages to a per country credit system if a corporation is in an excess credit position overall 
but not in a country in which it intends to invest more capital. From 1921 to 1932 the credit was a 
worldwide or overall limitation. Between 1932 and 1954, foreign tax credits were limited to the 
lesser of the overall limitation or a limitation of credit per country. From 1954 to 1960, a per 
country tax credit limitation was in effect; from 1960 to 1975 the corporation was allowed to 
choose between a per country and the overall limitation. Since 1975 the overall limitation has 
been in effect (see Joint Committee on Taxation 1987, Title XII, p.855).
17.Capital-export neutrality is violated under a territorial tax system unless the home and host 
country tax systems happen to be the same.
18.For more discussion of foreign taxation in other countries, see Hines and Hubbard (1989).
19.The Canadian exemption of repatriated dividends from home country taxation stems from 
the exemption of all intercorporate dividends from further taxation. The exemption avoids the 
double taxation of dividends, as they have already been taxed as profits before distribution as div 
idends (see Kitchen 1987, pp. 357-358).
20.1n fact, Horst (1977) states erroneously that the tax rate on foreign investment is a 
weighted average of the home and host country tax rates, as repatriated profits are taxed at home 
country rates and retained earnings are taxed at (relatively low?) host country rates. Thus, the res 
idence-based U.S. tax code was alleged to favor foreign investment over domestic investment and 
that pushed the U.S. Congress to introduce a number of tax bills in the 1960s and 1970s that 
would have eliminated the deferral of home country taxes on retained earnings of foreign corpora 
tions (Horst 1977). The repeal of tax deferral never passed Congress, however.
21.For a discussion of other aspects of the taxation of foreign direct investment in the United 
States, see Hines (1988), Jun (1989), Goodspeed and Frisch (1989), Hines and Hubbard (1989), 
Altshuler and Fulghieri (1990), Sinn (1990), and Hines and Rice (1990). Hufbauer (1992) pro 
vides a blueprint for reforming U.S. taxation of foreign income.
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22.Some states, although not unitary per se, enforce strict rules about combining business 
income for affiliates and corporations that have joint stock ownership and other aspects in com 
mon, although the affiliates do not operate in their state. In effect the state operates a form of uni 
tary taxation without being called a unitary state.
23.Some states operate a domestic waters edge combination which combines incomes only of 
affiliates doing business in the United States. For a discussion of the unitary tax see Moore, 
Steece, and Swenson (1987) and Hellerstein (1983). The discussion above relies-extensively on 
information provided in both of these sources. For a discussion of affiliated business groups, see 
New York State Department of Taxation and Finance (1992).
24.We did not account for domestic unitary taxation in our analysis, although several other 
authors have found its coefficient statistically significant in their analysis of the locations of for 
eign plants. We believe that their findings may be a statistical artifact, as many of the domestic 
unitary states, such as Idaho, Montana, Nebraska, and Utah, are very small and would probably 
have few foreign manufacturing plants locating there with or without a domestic unitary tax.
25.Manufacturing plants are those classified in SIC codes 20 to 39.
26.The so-called high-tech industries are categorized within these major industry groups. For 
a discussion of high-tech categories and the merits of high-tech firms, see Tyson (1992).
27.Hartman departs from Horst's (1977) analysis pointing out that Horst ignored the future 
home country liabilities for foreign investments. Thus, averaging the host and home country tax 
rates was not correct. Hartman points out that Horst's average tax rate results result from his fail 
ing to take account of taxes ultimately due on repatriated foreign investment. Horst in effect treats 
deferral as an exemption from home country taxes on retained earnings or as if retained earnings 







Building on the empirical trends in chapter 1, we begin here by 
examining the location patterns of new foreign manufacturing plants in 
the International Trade Administration data base from 1978 to 1987. 
Plant location is examined by country of origin for the four leading 
investors as well as for the total of all foreign plants. We identify some 
distinct concentrations of new foreign plants in particular states.
We next examine the findings and methodologies of empirical stud 
ies of foreign direct investment. There are two types of studies in the 
empirical literature. The first focuses on the determinants of aggregate 
flows of FDI among countries. This literature will help us decipher 
how important such variables as national tax policy and aggregate 
location determinants are to FDI flows among countries. Unfortu 
nately, the empirical literature does not test exactly the many aspects of 
the theories of aggregate FDI flows examined in chapter 1, but we are 
able to draw some implications from the findings.
A second strand of the literature examines the determinants of FDI 
location among states within a given country or among a set of coun 
tries located in a particular region, such as the European Economic 
Community (EEC). We gain additional insight into why FDI might 
locate in particular states of the United States and whether the policy 
levers available to state governments can make a particular state more 
attractive to foreign plants and investors. Finally, we compare the loca 
tion results obtained for foreign investors to the results obtained in the 
firm location literature in general. Are foreign investors looking for 
something different in their locations from what domestic investors are 
looking for?
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Location of New Foreign Manufacturing Plants 
in the United States
As noted earlier, foreign investors located 1,197 new manufacturing 
plants in the United States between 1978 and 1987. Figure 2.1 maps 
the concentration of the 1,197 new plants by state. The largest concen 
trations of new manufacturing plants occur in seven states: California, 
Texas, Tennessee, Georgia, North Carolina, Illinois and New York. 
Together, these states account for 47 percent of the total number of 
plant locations during the 1978 to 1987 period. Those concentrations 
aside, foreign investors locate the vast majority of their new manufac 
turing plants in the eastern half of the United States.
Seventy-four percent of the new foreign manufacturing plants are 
from four countries: Canada, Germany, Japan, and the United King 
dom. The next four figures illustrate the concentrations of new plant 
locations in states by country of the major investor. The 105 Canadian 
plant locations are heavily concentrated in New York State, which has 
26 percent of the new Canadian plants (see figure 2.2). North Carolina 
accounts for another 10 percent of the new Canadian plant locations. 
Tennessee and California each had about 8 percent of the new Cana 
dian plants.
German plant locations are displayed in figure 2.3. Connecticut, 
New York, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Cal 
ifornia account for 45 percent of the 215 German plant locations in the 
United States during the 1978 to 1987 period. The 215 plants are also 
heavily concentrated in the eastern states.
By contrast, new Japanese plant locations are heavily concentrated 
in California, Washington, and Texas (see figure 2.4). These three 
states account for 30 percent of the 402 new Japanese plants locating in 
the United States during the 1978 to 1987 period. Another six eastern 
states—Ohio, Georgia, North Carolina, Tennessee, New Jersey, and 
New York—account for 33 percent of Japanese new plants. United 
Kingdom investors concentrate 54 percent of their 123 manufacturing 
plant locations in eight states, namely, North Carolina, Texas, Georgia, 
Florida, New Jersey, Tennessee, Connecticut, and Ohio (see figure 
2.5).
Figure 2.1 Location of Foreign Manufacturing Plants in the United States, 1978 to 1987 (1,197 plants)




Figure 2.2 Location of Canadian Manufacturing Plants in the United States, 1978 to 1987 (105 plants)
Figure 2.3 Location of German Manufacturing Plants in the United States, 1978 to 1987 (215 plants)




Figure 2.4 Location of Japanese Manufacturing Plants in the United States, 1978 to 1987 (402 plants)
1 to 4
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Several interesting patterns appear to emerge. For example, these 
foreign investors tend to locate their plants in states that are geographi 
cal nearer their own country. The Canadians have heavily concentrated 
their locations in New York State, while Germany and the United 
Kingdom have concentrated their investments in the Eastern states. 
Japanese investors appear to prefer states on the West Coast. North 
Carolina, and to some extent Georgia, are also popular location choices 
for all four countries, while Tennessee was a popular location for three 
of the four countries.
Concentration of Industry in States
As noted in chapter 1, about 57 percent of the 1,197 new foreign 
manufacturing plant locations during the 1978 to 1987 period are in 
four major industry groups: Chemicals and Allied Products (196 
plants), Industrial Machinery and Equipment (187), Electronic and 
Other Electric Equipment (175), and Transportation Equipment (128). 
Plants in these major groups cluster in from five to nine states, depend 
ing on the major industry group. For example, 47.5 percent of the 
plants in the Chemicals and Allied Products category are concentrated 
in five states: Texas, followed by North Carolina, New Jersey, Georgia 
and Delaware (see table 2.1). About 60 percent of the foreign plants in 
the industrial machinery and equipment group are concentrated in nine 
states, with the largest concentrations in North Carolina, California, 
Connecticut and Georgia, and lower concentrations in Tennessee, 
Texas, New York, Illinois, and Michigan. Overall, about 61 percent of 
the foreign plants in Electronic and Other Electrical Equipment are 
concentrated in eight states, with California and Georgia having 28 
percent of the foreign plants. Plants in this major group also concen 
trate in North Carolina, Texas, Tennessee, New York, Indiana and Del 
aware. Almost 69 percent of the foreign plants in transportation 
equipment are concentrated in the auto alley states and California, New 
York, and Texas. For example, over 15 percent of the new plant loca 
tions are in Ohio, while foreign plants in the Transportation Equipment 
group are also concentrated in Michigan, Tennessee, Kentucky, Illi 
nois, and Indiana.
Figure 2.5 Location of United Kingdom Manufacturing Plants in the United States, 1978 to 1987 (123 plants)
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Table 2.1 State Concentrations of New Foreign Plants for Four Major 


























































SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, ITA data on new plants.
NOTE: If more than 4 percent of the new plants in a major group are located in a state, it qualifies
here as a concentration of the industry.
We cannot explain here the strong concentrations of new plants in 
particular states. The location patterns may be tied to industry agglom 
eration economies available in each state or to the availability of a 
known workforce or environment due to previous investments in the 
states. In the latter case, the locations may not appear to represent the 
most attractive locations when a standard set of cost and market vari 
ables is examined. However, when considerations internal to the firm 
enter the calculations, the observed locations dominate the alternatives.
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For example, if a number of Canadian subsidiaries are already located 
in New York State, the firm may consider locating an additional plant 
there rather than in another state, even though the latter state now 
appears to have lower costs. The firm can probably spread internal 
economies of scope, such as managerial expertise, more easily among 
plants located in proximity to one another than when plants are located 
in areas more remote from one another.
In addition, there is some evidence (Tyson 1992) that Japanese firms 
locate plants producing automobiles as well as parts suppliers in close 
proximity to one another to increase parts and product reliability and 
the overall quality of the final product. That practice, if followed, 
would also help to account for high concentrations of firms from a par 
ticular country in particular states. It seems unlikely that empirical 
work could account for many of these variables. Nonetheless, we will 
attempt to account for the concentrations of firms in particular loca 
tions, even if we cannot totally explain the reasons for the concentra 
tions. Put another way, we also recognize that concentration economies 
internal to the firm and other than the industry agglomeration econo 
mies that are measured with published data might explain the observed 
concentrations of these industries.
Aggregate Foreign Direct Investment Studies
The recent literature on aggregate FDI flows among countries fol 
lows two distinct courses. One strand focuses almost exclusively on 
U.S. corporate tax policy as a determinant of the volume of FDI in the 
United States. A second strand largely ignores corporate tax policy and 
focuses on nontax economic determinants of FDI. The main features 
and findings of eight major studies that focus on determination of FDI 
flows among nations are summarized in table 2.2.
Do Taxes Matter in Aggregate Investment Decisions?
Hartman (1984) has pioneered the recent empirical work on FDI in 
the United States, or at least the work that emphasizes the effect of 
taxes on FDI flows. His research, while omitting many other determi-
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nants of foreign investment, relates inward U.S. FDI to rates of return 
on investment variables and to the relative U.S. tax rates faced by for 
eign and domestic investors. Following his distinction between mature 
and immature investors (mentioned in chapter 1), Hartman examines 
separately investments of existing foreign subsidiaries financed by 
retained earnings (mature firms) and investments financed by transfers 
of funds from parent corporations. In both cases, however, Hartman 
finds that the relative effective U.S. tax rates faced by foreign and 
domestic investors significantly affect FDI within the United States. In 
all of the regressions that he runs with aggregate data from the 1965 to 
1979 period, the elasticities of inward investment flows to the United 
States with respect to the relative tax rates are significantly larger than 
unity, and in some cases the elasticity estimates are larger than two. 
His results reveal a substantial role for corporate tax policy in attract 
ing and maintaining FDI flows into the United States. However, the 
regressions explaining FDI financed by transfers from parent corpora 
tions fit the data less well than the regressions for FDI financed by 
retained earnings. The former elasticities are also less statistically sig 
nificant compared to the latter case. Nonetheless, while he appropri 
ately cautions about the simplicity of the model specification, Hartman 
finds that U.S. tax policy significantly affects inward FDI. Hartman's 
empirical results are also consistent with his theoretical analysis, which 
led him to suggest that there is capital-import, but not capital-export, 
neutrality.
Hartman's pathbreaking work in this area set the tone for this line of 
research. For example, subsequent papers follow his separate analyses 
of investment financed from transfers and from retained earnings. The 
research also shares his emphasis on the role of tax policy.
Boskin and Gale (1987) update Hartman's analysis using revised 
measures of effective tax rates and conduct the analysis over different 
time periods. Their results for the 1965 to 1979 period are similar to 
Hartman's, although Boskin and Gale's point estimates of the parame 
ters, while still elastic, are somewhat smaller than Hartman's. When 
they also analyze U.S. inward FDI during the 1956 to 1984 and the 
1965 to 1984 time periods, they find that FDI was more responsive to 
tax differentials after 1965, and elasticities of investment with respect 
to the various specifications of the tax rates for the 1965 to 1984 period 
are similar to the estimates that Hartman finds.
Table 2.2 Results From Studies of the Determinants of FDI Flows Among Countries
Study Country of analysis and period Principal findings
Hartman FDI inflows to U.S. from 1965 to 1979. FDI financed 
(1984) from retained earnings and transfers from parent cor 
porations analyzed separately. Variables are relative 
return on investments and U.S. tax rates faced by for 
eign and domestic firms.
Boskin and FDI flows to U.S. from 1956 to 1984. They adapt 
Gale (1987) Hartman's model by using an updated series on
effective tax rates and adding a GNP variable and a
dummy variable for the 1980s.
Young (1988) Inward FDI to U.S. from retained earnings and trans 
fers using revised data on effective rates of return. 
Data are for 1956 to 1984. Basic Hartman models are 
augmented with a lagged dependent variable and a 
GNP variable.
Slemrod FDI flows into the U.S. by country of investor: Can- 
0989) ada, France, Netherlands, West Germany, Italy, 
Japan, United Kingdom. The first four countries 
operate territorial tax systems and the last three oper 
ate residential tax systems. Also explains total FDI, 
FDI financed from retained earnings and from trans 
fers from parents. Time period is from 1960 to 1987 
or 1962 to 1987 (for two countries).
Taxes have a substantial effect on inward FDI flows. Elasticities of 
FDI with respect to taxes range from above unity to just above two, 
and are generally larger for FDI financed from retained earnings than 
from transfers from parents. Equations explaining FDI from transfers 
fit less well than those explaining FDI from retained earnings.
For 1965 to 1979 period, results are similar to Hartman's. Augment 
ing the model with GNP and other variables does not alter the basic 
results. The elasticities of FDI with respect to taxes are higher in the 
1965 to 1984 period than in the 1956 to 1984 period. Retained earn 
ings fit the equations better than transfers from parents.
In the augmented model, elasticities of retained earnings with respect 
to tax rates and rates of return are smaller than Hartman and Boskin 
and Gale find. Young finds that FDI financed from transfers from 
parents are inelastic with respect to both taxes and rate of return vari 
ables.
Variables include GDPin home country relative to GDPin U.S., 
unemployment rate of prime-age males in U.S., real exchange rate of 
U.S. dollars relative to the home country's real exchange rate, and the 
Auerbach and Hines (1988) measure of the marginal effective corpo 
rate income tax rate on fixed investment in the U.S. 
Coefficients for real GDP and real exchange rates generally have 
the correct signs and are statistically significant. The coefficients on 
the tax variables reveal no strong role for taxes in either territorial or 
residential tax countries.
Cushman U.S. FDI inflows and outflows to and from five 
(1987) countries: Canada, Japan, United Kingdom, France, 
Germany. Data from 1963 to 1981.
Culem (1988) FDI inflows among six industrialized countries
(U.S., Germany, France, United Kingdom, Nether 
lands, Belgium), 1969-1982. Analyzes FDI inflows 
into all six countries, inflows from U.S. to EEC 
countries, inflows from EEC to U.S., and inflows 
among EEC countries only.
Ray (1989) FDI flow into U.S. by industry from these countries: 
Japan, Canada, total of EEC countries. 1979 to 1985.
Mann (1989) Japanese FDI in U.S. for 12 major manufacturing
groups 1977 to 1987. Examines Japanese investment 
in new plants, increases in Japanese equity holdings 
in existing manufacturing firms in U.S., and total 
investment in new plants and equity increases.
FDI inflows to the U.S. increase with its real GNP, a lower dollar 
exchange rate, and a stable exchange rate. However, higher wages in 
the U.S. and higher productivity in the home country reduce the FDI 
inflow to the U.S.
The pooled results for all countries in the sample indicate that higher 
real GDPin the host country, a wider gap between real GDPin the 
host and home countries, and higher home country exports to the 
host country increase the FDI flow to the host country. Higher labor 
costs in the host country reduce FDI inflows, however. 
FDI flows from the EEC countries to the U.S. increase with a higher 
GDPin the U.S., higher tariff rates in the U.S., and higher exports 
from the home country to the U.S.
The principal findings suggest that U.S. GNP growth increases FDI 
inflow from other countries to the U.S. Except for Japan, where the 
exchange rate has no effect on FDI flow, a low-dollar exchange rate 
increases FDI inflow to the U.S. Higher growth in a four-digit indus 
try within the U.S. leads to more FDI in that same industry.
Higher savings in Japan, higher U.S. nontariff barriers, and higher 
sales of the product by firms already in the U.S. increase equity, new 
plant, and the total of equity and new plant investments. Higher raw 
material costs in the U.S. reduce equity investment and total invest 
ment, but not specifically new plant investment. Higher world inter 
est rates reduce new plant investment and total investment, but not 
investment to increase equity.
Dollar-yen exchange rate and labor costs in the U.S. have no effect 
on equity and new plant investments in the U.S.
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They then depart from Hartman's empirical specification and aug 
ment the right-hand-side tax variables with a GNP variable and a time 
dummy variable equal to unity for the 1980s and zero otherwise. How 
ever, the new variables do not affect the elasticities for the tax vari 
ables. Also consistent with Hartman, Boskin and Gale find that the 
regressions examining investment financed by retained earnings fit the 
data much better than the regressions examining investment financed 
by transferred capital.
Young (1988) further modifies the Hartman model by introducing a 
lagged dependent variable and a GNP variable on the right-hand-side. 
Young finds FDI financed from retained earnings less responsive to 
both the tax and the rates of return variables than both Hartman and 
Boskin and Gale. Furthermore, the responsiveness of transferred funds 
to both the tax and rates of return variables is less than unity or inelas 
tic. Young's results indicate a diminished role for taxation in U.S. 
inward FDI financed from transferred funds. His results also imply that 
the simple Hartman model might not be the most appropriate for exam 
ining FDI flows, especially FDI flows financed by funds transferred 
from foreign parent corporations. 1
Slemrod (1989) also tests the influence of taxation on FDI in the 
United States during the 1956 to 1984 period. He augments Hartman's 
model with additional macroeconomic variables and also tests the 
proposition that U.S. taxes have more influence on investors from 
countries operating a territorial tax system than investors from coun 
tries operating a residential tax system with a credit for foreign taxes 
paid. He finds evidence that U.S. taxes affect total FDI and net trans 
fers from abroad, but do not affect FDI financed from retained earn 
ings. He also finds that whether a country operates a territorial or 
residential tax system has little influence on FDI flows.
The recent studies examined here in the end find a limited role for 
tax policy in the explanation of the aggregate flow of direct investment 
into the United States. For example, when more variables are added to 
the original models, the conclusion that taxes have a strong effect on 
FDI collapses. In addition, the econometrics used to estimate the mod 
els in the later papers is more sophisticated or the estimators are more 
efficient and likely to be more accurate. Measures of the tax variables 
themselves have also become more sophisticated; earlier tax variable 
measures might be erroneous.
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But should not tax factors make a difference? Why should we accept 
the findings of no tax effects if our intuition suggests otherwise? Recall 
that Gordon and Jun, as well as our argument in chapter 1 describe the 
complexity of the taxation of foreign capital flows. The possibilities to 
avoid capital taxation through timing of repatriations and adjusting 
financial behavior could lead to a neutral effect of taxation on aggre 
gate financial flows. However, underneath the aggregate data may be 
substantial tax effects on financial transactions that are designed solely 
to reduce the tax impact on capital income. Thus, while aggregate stud 
ies may fail to identify tax effects, the effects may indeed be substan 
tial. We suggest that taxation can affect aggregate capital flows even if 
and because corporate financial policy is designed to neutralize the 
effects of taxation on capital flows.
Other Influences on FDI Flows
Several researchers perform time-series or pooled cross-section/ 
time series analyses that all but ignore taxation issues and focus on 
other economic dimensions of the foreign investment decision. Several 
of the studies examine FDI inflows into the United States as well as 
into other major countries, while others confine their inquiry to U.S. 
inflows of FDI. Four of these studies are summarized in the latter half 
of table 2.2. There is some consensus among the research findings, 
although the findings do not always point in the same direction. In 
some cases, for example, the conflicting evidence garnered from stud 
ies of combined FDI flows from several countries into the United 
States is reconciled when the flows are examined by country of origin.
Wage Effects
Earlier empirical literature found no evidence (Dunning 1980) that 
higher wages influenced FDI. 2 Among the four studies (Cushman 
1987; Culem 1988; Ray 1989; and Mann 1989) summarized in table 
2.2, Cushman, examining U.S. FDI inflows from and outflows to the 
five other major investing countries during the 1963 to 1981 period, 
finds that host country wages are a statistically significant determinant 
of FDI inflows to countries. A related finding is that higher productiv 
ity in the home country of the investor leads to less FDI outflow to 
other countries. Similarly, Culem finds that host country unit labor
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costs deter FDI inflows into particular European Economic Commu 
nity (EEC) countries. To be specific, unit labor costs did not affect the 
aggregate size of the FDI flowing to the EEC, but unit labor costs 
determine to some degree the location choice for the FDI or the desti 
nation of FDI within the EEC countries. The latter is an important 
observation for our research on FDI location within the United States, 
because relative wage costs among the states may attract (or deter) FDI 
to (from) certain states. More to the point, Culem finds that wage costs 
do not influence the aggregate flow of FDI to the United States; he did 
not test, however, the location choice of FDI among states.
Market Variables: Gross Domestic Product, Tariffs
Five of six major studies (Cushman 1987; Ohullachain 1984; Mann 
1989; Culem 1988; and Ray 1989) find that the level of Gross Domes 
tic Product (GDP) and the growth of GDP in the host country attract 
FDI especially in the case of the United States (Caves 1982 is the sixth 
study). According to these studies, one attraction of FDI is access to 
the American market place. The studies are divided about the impor 
tance of tariffs and other trade barriers. Caves, Culem and Mann find 
that the circumvention of trade barriers is an important incentive to 
invest directly in the trade-restricting country, while Ray and Cushman 
find no evidence that tariff barriers influence FDI flows.
Exchange Rates
The literature is less divided on the role of exchange rates and 
exchange rate stability. While not all studies examine the role of 
exchange rates in FDI flows, studies that include exchange rates in the 
analyses conclude that devaluation of the host country currency rela 
tive to the home country currency accelerates FDI, except in the case 
of Japanese investors. Studies examining only Japanese FDI in other 
countries find no role for exchange rates.
Levinsohn (1989) points out, however, that a role for exchange rates 
in FDI is unexpected. If the U.S. dollar, for example, is low relative to 
its equilibrium value, firms could earn profits by arbitrage in the for 
eign exchange market for dollars without accelerating FDI. Nonethe 
less, in many cases lower-priced dollars accelerate FDI even if the 
exchange rate does not influence the location or type and size of the 
investment. 3
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Lessons for States
What can state policymakers learn from this literature on aggregate 
investment flows? First, if wages are important to the investor, they are 
more likely to influence the firm's location within the United States 
rather than affect the decision about the aggregate size of FDI in the 
United States. To be specific, the choice to enter the United States is 
mainly determined by the size of the market for the product and by 
growth in that market. More populous states or ones near large concen 
trations of population may fare better in attracting foreign investors.
United States tariff and nontariff barriers are important influences 
on the volume of FDI into the United States. Industries that face signif 
icant U.S. trade barriers are particularly good candidates for recruit 
ment to a state. In addition, recruiting foreign investment may be easier 
when the U.S. dollar is weak relative to other currencies.
According to Ray, FDI in the United States tends to be in those 
industries that are also growing domestically in the United States. The 
evidence shown in figure 1.4 and table 1.5 of chapter 1 tends to support 
the conclusions of Ray's study. Thus, states should not necessarily look 
for foreign investors who will replace the dying industries in their 
states with those same industries. In all likelihood, the FDI will be in 
the very industries that prosper domestically. Thus, states that have a 
workforce trained in a dying industry will still want to think about 
retraining programs to make their workforce suitable to growing indus 
tries within the United States, as opposed to attracting foreign inves 
tors who will utilize the existing skills of the displaced workers. 
Another implication growing out of Ray's findings is that states will 
want to be careful in offering generous tax and other concessions to 
attract foreign investors, especially when the concessions could give an 
advantage to foreign firms relative to domestic firms in the same grow 
ing industries within the state.4
Studies of FDI Location Within the United States
Table 2.3 summarizes seven major studies performed on FDI loca 
tion within the United States during the 1980s. With the exception of 
the Glickman and Woodward (1987) research, all of the studies use
Table 23 Summary of Selected Studies of FDI Location in the United States from 1980 to 1989____________
Variables with statistically significant coefficients and their 











1976 cross-section of 2,151 acqui- Dependent variable: share of the 
sitions, mergers or new plants. total investment in each state.
Ordinary Least Squares step- 
wise regression applied to a list 
of right-hand-side variables.
Pools ITAdata, for years 1979, 
1981,1982,1983. Total of 76 new 
plant start- ups in three industry 
groups: SIC 38 (drug manufactur 
ing) SIC (355,356 (industrial 
machinery) SIC 371 (motor vehi 
cle production).
Net foreign investment in manu 
facturing assets by state for 1977 
to 1981.
BEA series on U.S. affiliate 
employment; employment 
growth between 1974 and 1983 in 
foreign manufacturing plants in 
each state.
Conditional multinomial logit 
for locations among states of 
new plants in each industry 
group
Dependent Variable: net foreign 
investment in gross assets by 
state. Regressions for each year 





•State located in the manufacturing belt (+)
•State and local expenditures per capita (+)
•Index of social well-being (-)
•Distance from New York City (-)
•Federal aid to state and local governments in the 
state (-)
•Manufacturing employees per capita (-)
•Retail sales per capita (-)
•Agglomeration economies (+)
•Wages (-) in two of three regressions






•Gravity measure of market in state (+)
•Percent change in per capita income (+)
•Right to work law (-)
•State spending per capita (-)
•Montana and Wyoming dummy variable (+)
•Ratio of farm population to manufacturing employment (+)
•Worldwide Unitary Taxation (-)
Friedman, Number of new manufacturing 
Gerlowski, plants in states for the 1976 to 
Silberman 1986 period. 
(1989)
Coughlin, ITA: Number of FDI investments 
Terza, in each state in 1981, 1982 and 
Arromdee 1983. (Investments include new 
(1991) plants, acquisitions, mergers, joint 
ventures, and other investments.)
Ordinary Least Squares per 
formed on total, high-tech and 
nonhigh-tech manufacturing 
plants. Independent variables 
averaged over the 1976 to 1986 
period.
Conditional logit model.
•Market potential (gravity measure) (+)
•Wage (-) (in total and high-tech manufacturing only)
•Scientists and Engineers per capita (+) (in high-tech manufactur 
ing only)
•State has a container port (+)
•State dollars spent attracting FDI (+) (for total and non-high-tech 
manufacturing)
•State land area (+)
•Income per capita (+)
•Production worker average wage rate (-)
•State unemployment rate (+)
•Manufacturing employment per square mile (+)
•Unitary taxation (-) in two of four equations
•Infrastructure variables (highways, RR miles, and airport facili 
ties per square mile) (+)
Woodward Japanese-affiliated manufa during Two levels of analysis: Selec- 
(1992) investments, 1980-1989. Data tion of states, selection of
from Japan Economic Institute. county within state. Uses multi- 
Total sample of 540 plants. nomial logit analysis; indepen 
dent variables are for 1980. For 
the county-level analysis, the 
estimation is performed sepa 
rately on a sample of total coun 
ties, auto-alley counties and 
non-auto-alley counties.
State Choice:
•Gravity measure of per capita income of state location (+)
•Unionization rate (-)
•Domestic unitary tax (-)
•Worldwide unitary tax (-)
•State office in Japan (+)
•Land area of the state (+)
•Pacific region of U.S. (+)
•East North Central region of U.S. (+)
•East South Central region of U.S. (+) 
County Choice:
•Manufacturing agglomeration (+)
•Population density (+) (Total and non-auto-alley only)
•Interstate highway connection (+)
•Poverty rate (-) (total and non-auto-alley only)
•Nonpoor black density (-) (auto-alley only)
•Unemployment rate (-) (total and auto-alley)
•land area (+)
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micro data to analyze location choice. However, the studies vary in 
their level of econometric sophistication and disaggregation of the 
analysis. For example, in some cases the sample sizes are very small 
(Luger and Shetty 1985), making their results potentially unreliable. 
Two of the studies, McConnell (1980) and Coughlin, Terza, and 
Arromdee (1991), are performed on a single year of data for the 
explanatory variables, while the other studies examine growth or start 
ups over a multiple-year period. Two studies (Luger and Shetty 1985 
and Friedman, Gerlowski, and Silberman 1989) distinguish new plants 
from other investments, but others perform the estimation on the entire 
group of new investments mixing acquisitions and joint ventures, for 
example, with new plants.
Despite considerable methodological differences among these exist 
ing studies, they share several findings. Agglomeration economies, 
urbanization economies, and measures of market demand are impor 
tant in attracting FDI to states. On the other hand, higher wages and 
worldwide unitary taxation deterred FDI within the states. Higher taxa 
tion in general, right-to-work laws, and unionization of the workforce, 
however, are generally not found to have a statistically significant 
effect on FDI in states.
While as a group the above studies reach similar conclusions, it is 
premature to regard the results as conclusive. Analysis using other data 
sets and further disaggregation of the data might generate different 
results for particular industries or home countries. Woodward's 1992 
study examines the location of Japanese manufacturing firms within 
the United States and is an example of how disaggregation of the data 
and the location decision can produce refinements in the conclusions.
It is worth describing his analysis and results in more detail here. He 
uses micro data for the 1980 to 1989 period on 540 plant locations 
obtained from the Japan Economic Institute and performs two levels of 
analysis: state choice and the selection of the county within the state. 
For the state analysis, he finds that higher per capita income in the 
region, a state economic development office located in Japan, the 
state's land area, and the state's location in the Pacific region, in the 
East North region, or in the East South region attracts Japanese manu 
facturing plants. On the other hand, a high level of unionization of the 
labor force in the state and unitary taxation deter Japanese manufactur 
ing locations.
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For the county-level analysis, he first examines counties in a pooled 
analysis and then disaggregates the counties into auto- and non-auto- 
alley counties within the United States. 5 The auto-alley countries are 
those lying in the states between Michigan and Tennessee. Manufac 
turing agglomeration economies, an interstate highway connection, 
and counties with larger land areas attract more plants in the pooled 
and in each of the auto- and the non-auto-alley county analyses. A 
higher population density in a county attracts more plants in the pooled 
county-level analysis and in the non-auto-alley analysis, whereas 
higher rates of poverty and unemployment deter Japanese manufactur 
ing plant locations in these same two types of counties. Property taxes 
do not influence plant locations in any of the county-level analyses.
Another finding is noteworthy. A higher percentage of blacks in the 
population deters location of Japanese manufacturing plants in the 
auto-alley counties. Woodward's finding on spatial discrimination is 
somewhat surprising, although racial discrimination by the Japanese 
has been the subject of some speculation.
Cole and Deskins (1988), for example, argue that Japanese auto pro 
ducers, and possibly other foreign investors, located in the United 
States effectively discriminate against blacks. By selecting rural sites 
for their plants, they employ fewer blacks than is typical in the indus 
try. Furthermore, Cole and Deskins point out that states offering subsi 
dies to foreign investors who practice discrimination against certain 
minorities by locating in certain rural counties may, in effect, be subsi 
dizing discrimination against blacks and other minority populations. 
While this is an interesting finding that needs further testing, a state- 
level location analysis such as ours is not likely to uncover such dis 
crimination patterns. Thus, while our results provide insight into the 
location decision at the state level, states should be aware of the poten 
tial for more subtle patterns of location within their state and the poten 
tial for discrimination.
Comparing the FDl Location Results 
with the General Location Literature
Numerous location studies of domestic firms and employment exist. 
Bartik (1991) cites 57 interarea studies or those that examine locations 
decisions among states or among metropolitan areas. As Wasylenko's
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(1991) review also suggests, the results of these studies vary consider 
ably. Most of the studies have focused on manufacturing employment, 
and that aspect of the work is consistent with the focus of the FDI stud 
ies.
Below we review the major results for the existing studies and point 
out consistencies with the results for FDI locations. While certain pat 
terns emerge, we emphasize that the results are not uniform across 
studies, subjecting interpretations of the results to considerable judge 
ment.
Wages
Wages represent a major component of costs and higher wages are 
expected to deter growth in manufacturing. A more productive labor 
force will lead to higher wages, so that wages must be compared to 
productivity measures. The latter variable is generally not observable, 
and many researchers develop proxy measures for productivity, such as 
the median number of school years completed by the adult population 
of an area. The productivity proxy measures are at best imperfect, and 
the studies do not adequately correct the measured wages levels for 
productivity differentials. Differences in productivity across areas and 
across time may account for the variation in results for the wage vari 
able among studies.
The majority of location studies find that areas with higher wages 
attract fewer manufacturing jobs over time, but in many cases the coef 
ficients on the wage variables are not statistically significant. The FDI 
studies reviewed here have nonuniform results for wages, suggesting 
in about half the cases that differentially higher area wages reduce the 
chances of attracting a new foreign manufacturing plant or investment. 
The nonrobust results for the wage variable are surprising, given the 
significance of wages in the costs of manufacturing. However, when 
the coefficients on wages are not statistically significant, other unmea 
sured factors, such as productivity or other endowments in the regions, 
may help to explain the attractiveness of the regions to some manufac 
turers, despite higher wages levels.
Unions
Unions can affect labor costs in several ways. Unions can raise 
wage and fringe benefits levels. The former effect should be captured
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in the wage variables, but to the extent that unions raise fringe benefit 
levels, unionization will have an impact on labor costs not already 
reflected in the wage level.
In addition, unionization can create a climate of tension between 
labor and management that reduces worker productivity. In some 
cases, union effects on productivity are more explicit. For example, 
union leaders have at times introduced work rules, such as assignment 
of a specific number of workers to a production process, leading to 
lower output per worker. A strike can produce an untimely disruption 
in the workplace.
The percentage of the U.S. manufacturing labor force that is union 
ized declined from 27.3 percent in 1984 to 23.8 percent in 1991 (U.S. 
Bureau of the Census 1992). The decline in unionization has largely 
tracked reduced employment in high-wage manufacturing jobs. Efforts 
to unionize nonmanufacturing sectors of the economy have not offset 
the losses in the manufacturing sector. Global competitiveness has also 
induced some unions to become more cooperative with management in 
some labor disputes, because both parties have realized that competi 
tion threatens corporate profitability and jobs at the corporation.
Unions can also improve the labor environment for management. 
For example, Freeman and Medoff (1984) suggest that a unionized 
firm can have higher productivity due to higher capital-labor ratios, 
less worker turnover, and the attraction of higher quality labor to 
unionized firms. Lower worker turnover, for example, reduces training 
costs and raises plant-specific human capital, which could account for 
the observed higher productivity.
The mixed a priori effects of unionization are reflected in mixed 
results for the unionization variable in business location studies. Many 
location studies find that unionization per se has no effect on business 
location or employment growth. Nonetheless, the issue is not settled, 
because other researchers find that unionization affects employment 
growth in manufacturing industries in general and in foreign manufac 
turing locations in particular. However, given the reduced coverage 
and influence of unions, their impact on location outcomes, while 
unsettled, is probably declining in significance.
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Agglomeration Economies
There is strong and consistent evidence that specific types of firms 
are attracted to similar places. Agglomeration may bestow benefits, for 
example, from vertical interactions between firms that sell intermediate 
inputs and firms that purchase the inputs. The agglomeration of firms 
may also result in the attraction of a greater number of skilled workers 
to reside near the firms, and the skilled workers may in turn attract 
more firms. Thus, measures of agglomeration economies persistently 
turn up significant positive coefficients for manufacturing location 
decisions in both the general and the foreign manufacturing location 
literature.
Fiscal Variables
Fiscal variables have generated more controversy than any of the 
other findings. In part, policymakers have direct control over expendi 
tures and tax levels and that heightens their interest in the effects of fis 
cal variables on job creation. Studies vary significantly in the 
sophistication with which they handle fiscal variables. Few studies use 
the balanced-budget technique of Helms (1985), which includes all 
expenditures and taxes in the estimated equation. Most studies include 
a portion of the tax and expenditure variables or leave out the expendi 
ture side completely. Thus, the comparability of the results across stud 
ies is especially difficult in this case.
In the general literature on business location and employment 
growth, tax variables and public expenditure variables are statistically 
significant in a number of studies. Bartik (1991) has assessed this liter 
ature and concludes that in the majority of studies, tax variables influ 
ence business location of manufacturing firms. Wasylenko and 
McGuire (1985) contributes to the evidence on significant tax effects.
Many of the studies that find significant effects for fiscal variables in 
manufacturing are performed on data from the 1970s. Wasylenko has 
attempted unsuccessfully to reproduce the tax results using data from 
the 1980s. Carroll and Wasylenko (1993) examine specifically whether 
the data for the 1970s follow a different regime than data for the 1980s. 
Indeed, the regimes are different and manufacturing employment 
growth responds to fiscal variables for the 1970 data but not for the 
1980 data. It appears that fiscal differentials narrowed among states in
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the 1980s, making the fiscal differentials less significant as a location 
or growth determinant.
Those findings cause us to examine the existing literature on fiscal 
effects in a different light. Many of the studies that use 1980 data, 
including the studies of FDI reported here, do not find statistically sig 
nificant effects for the fiscal variables. Thus, the general level of taxa 
tion in a state does not appear to affect FDI. However, none of the 
studies includes expenditure variables in the analysis.
Foreign firms are concerned with more than the general level of tax 
ation in a state, however. As noted in chapter 1, a state's use of world 
wide unitary or domestic unitary taxation affects the taxable status of 
the firm's profits in other countries. Most of the FDI empirical studies 
examine worldwide unitary taxation and find that states using that form 
of taxation to determine taxable profits have a lower probability of 
attracting foreign investors. The two studies that include domestic uni 
tary taxation in the model find that its use also dampens FDI activity in 
the state.
Closer inspection of the states that use domestic unitary taxation 
makes us cautious about accepting the conclusion about its dampening 
effects. Moore, Steece, and Swenson (1987) list Colorado, Illinois, 
Kansas, Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, and Utah (and in practice 
New York) as domestic unitary states. But three of the domestic unitary 
states (Montana, Nebraska, and Utah) have virtually no new foreign 
plants located in them (see figure 2.1) and three others (Colorado, Kan 
sas, and Massachusetts) have a small number of foreign plants in them. 
The domestic unitary tax variable may pick up regional effects or iso 
late states that have few if any foreign firms for reasons unrelated to 
the domestic unitary tax. Put more directly, the results on the domestic 
unitary tax variable may be spurious.
In summary, we believe that there are broad similarities between the 
existing studies on general firm location and the studies on FDI. How 
ever, the latter area is still not thoroughly explored, and further studies 
may identify wider gaps between the location decisions of foreign and 
domestic firms.
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NOTES
1. In addition, Newlon (1987), as summarized in Shah and Slemrod (1990), replicates the 
Hartman and Boskin and Gale models and identifies mistakes in the calculations of rate of return 
in the data set used in their analysis. When he applies the corrected data to the 1965 to 1979 
period, he finds that the retained earnings equations do not fit as well as when they are fitted with 
the unrevised data, but the transfer equations fit somewhat better using the revised data as com 
pared to the fits using the unrevised data. However, when Newlon analyzes FDI from 1956 to 
1984, none of the coefficients in the transfer equation is statistically significant.
2. For a review of the earlier literature, see Caves (1982).
3. While the review of the literature has focused on FDI into the United States, the Shah and 
Slemrod (1990) study of FDI in Mexico deserves mention due to its thoroughness and interesting 
findings. Shah and Slemrod examine FDI in Mexico during the 1965 to 1987 period. Their model 
accounts for host and home country taxation and incorporates Mexico's tariff policy, credit wor 
thiness, and an index of the regulatory environment. In addition, they incorporate Mexico's mar 
ginal effective tax rates into their analysis, arguing that marginal tax rates are better indicators of 
the incentives to invest. They also include average effective tax rates for the U.S. in their model. 
For the transfers equation, the coefficients on the marginal effective tax rate in Mexico and credit 
worthiness are statistically significant and indicate that higher tax rates and worse credit ratings 
reduce FDI transfers from abroad. For the retained earnings equation, the coefficients on credit 
worthiness, marginal effective tax rates in Mexico and average tax rates in the home country are 
statistically significant and affect FDI in the hypothesized ways. Thus, Hartman's hypothesis 
about the insignificance of home country tax rates is not confirmed. Moreover, Mexico's tariff 
structure and its regulatory environment do not influence its inward FDI.
4. A reviewer has pointed out that Ray's finding that FDI industries are similar to industries 
growing in the United States may not be particularly robust over time. The reviewer cites the 
automotive sector as a counterexample to the Ray conclusion. The reviewer may be correct for 
that particular industry. We note, however, that Ray's measure of domestic industry growth is the 
increase in the value of product shipped and not employment growth. The implication is that man 
ufacturing industries with large productivity gains may experience relatively large gains in the 
value of shipments but slow employment growth or even employment losses. If employment is 
used to gauge industry growth patterns, the domestic growth industries could appear to be declin 
ing rather than growing.
5. To keep the data-gathering manageable, Woodward's sample includes all counties that have 
a Japanese manufacturing plant located in them and a random sample of nine counties in each 
state that do not have a Japanese manufacturing plant located in them.
Modeling the Location 
of New Plants
In principle at least, the choice of a state for the location of a new 
plant seems straightforward. The firm would examine the potential 
profits to be earned in each state and choose the state that offers the 
highest profit.
In practice, the location choice is much more difficult for a host of 
reasons. Firms will presumably have a long-range definition of profits 
in mind, and in that case the firm will choose states that have favorable 
economic variables now and favorable expected economic variables 
over the profit horizon of the plant. Firms might use the information on 
all past values of the relevant economic variables in an attempt to make 
forecasts about their future values. However, unless we know exactly 
how this is done, there seems to be little hope that we would be able to 
duplicate such a method independently. We therefore assume in our 
analysis that the current values of the relevant variables are the firms' 
best forecasts for future values.
Furthermore, it seems unlikely that we, as researchers, will be able 
to identify or use all the relevant variables that go into the firm's deci 
sion. Accordingly, we will subsume all of the relevant variables that we 
cannot identify or use into a random component that acts like a distur 
bance in a linear regression model.
The subjection of profits to a random component allows us to use 
econometric methods to identify the influence of each identified inde 
pendent variable on the probability of location in a particular state. 
However, the choice of an econometric method to use on the problem 
is fraught with several ponderous estimation issues.
In this chapter, we first address the conceptual profit maximization 
problem and discuss the general class of econometric estimation mod 
els that are consistent with the profit maximization problem. After that, 
we point out the limitations of the most straightforward econometric 
model within the class and then turn to refinements of the basic estima-
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tion model that will lead to more reliable estimates of the model's coef 
ficients.
Maximizing Location Choice and a Baseline 
Estimation Method
We follow the typical modeling approach to location choice. The 
firm selects a state site for a new plant by examining a vector of its 
potential profits across the 48 states, n. The firm chooses the state cor 
responding to the element in K with the highest profit level. If we let TC/ 
denote the firm's forecasted profits in state i, then state i is chosen only 
if
rc/smaxOCf,...,^). (3.1)
We, of course, only observe the firm's choice of state for location of 
the plant, and do not observe the firm's forecasts of its profits at each 
site.
While we do not observe the forecasted profits, we can infer the 
important determinants of these profits by analyzing econometrically 
the choices that firms actually have made. We postulate a priori that 
they are a function of observed characteristics in each state, such as 
wages, agglomeration economies, fiscal variables, and other variables 
which we will discuss in the next chapter. Write these observed charac 
teristics as a vector Xs for state s.
Forecasted potential profits in each state s can now be written as a 
function of Xs and a random error, es,
Ks = X£ + es , (3.2)
where p is the vector of estimated coefficients. Therefore, a particular 
state i is chosen if
X/P + el->Xyp + e, for s*i. (3.3)
Modeling the Location of New Plants 67
The standard assumption is that the residuals e, are independently 
and identically distributed as a type I extreme-value distribution (also 
called a Weibull distribution), which has a cumulative distribution 
function of
F(e) = exp (-exp(-e)) . (3.4)
Then the probability of choosing a given state i can be expressed as 
48
/>(/) = exp (Xft)/ Z exp(X,P) (3.5) s=J
The baseline estimation is a standard multinomial logit estimation. 
Many computer software packages will readily produce estimates of 
the p coefficients. However, the standard multinomial logit estimation 
method involves a very strong assumption that the addition of a state to 
the choice set or the deletion of a state from the choice set does not 
affect the relative probabilities of the choice of state i and state j. This 
property, known as the "independence of irrelevant alternatives" (HA), 
means that the relative probabilities of choosing a location in New 
York and in Pennsylvania, for example, are not affected when North 
Carolina or Texas are removed from the choice set of locations. Put 
differently, if, for example, North Carolina is removed from the choice 
set of locations, the probabilities of choosing New York and of choos 
ing Pennsylvania are changed in the same direction and by an equal 
percentage.
The presence of the IIA property can be demonstrated using equa 
tion (3.5). The relative probabilities of choosing any two states depend 
only on the information in X for the two states in question. In our New 
York (NY) and Pennsylvania (PA) example,
/W) / P(PA) = exptXjvyp) / exp^p) . (3.6)
In moving from (3.5) to (3.6), the denominator on the right-hand- 
side of equation (3.5) cancels out of the numerator and denominator of 
(3.6). With the elimination of the denominators, the information in the 
vector X for North Carolina is removed or becomes irrelevant to the 
relative probabilities of locating in New York or Pennsylvania. 1
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From an economic or analytical perspective, the imposition of the 
IIA property means that the relative probability over two location 
choices does not depend on the existence of close substitutes for either 
location. To many analysts such an assumption seems overly restrictive 
and unrealistic. Nonetheless, research in this area has applied the stan 
dard multinomial logit model to location choices. We examine some 
alternative estimation methods below.
Nested Multinomial Logit
For the choice of location among 48 states, the nested multinomial 
logit model (NMNL) developed in McFadden (1978) postulates resid 
uals that have a generalized extreme-value distribution; the distribution 
avoids the IIA assumption. 2 McFadden also showed that the NMNL 
model can be derived from a stochastic utility or in our case a stochas 
tic profit-maximization model.
The NMNL model takes advantage of a hierarchical decisionmaking 
structure. In our problem, for example, we can assume that firms make 
location decisions sequentially. They choose a region of the country 
and then choose a state within the chosen region. The NMNL model 
carries two advantages. The standard multinomial logit model is nested 
within it and thus when we estimate the simple NMNL model, we can 
detect, based on the value of a parameter, whether the IIA assumption 
is appropriate.
To present this advantage in more detail, we present succinctly the 
mathematics of the simple NMNL model and relate the analysis pre 
sented above to the relevant parameters of the model.
The Simple NMNL Model
The firm will choose a region r and then a state i within the region. 
The choice of region and state will then be the probability of choosing 
state i given the region r multiplied by the probability of choosing the 
region r. In symbols,
(3.7)
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The conditional and marginal probability can be rewritten as 
P(i\f) = exp(X,-p) / Z exp(X,P) (3.8)
ser
and
P(r) = exp(7ra) Z expC^P) / Z exp(yr- a) Z exp(X,> P) , (3.9)© ©©ser
where the outer summation in the denominator of (3.9) is taken over all 
regions r'. Here Yr is the vector of attributes that vary only with 
region r.
Now define an inclusive value Ir as follows:
7r = logZexp(X,p).
ser
This allows us to rewrite equations (3.8) and (3.9) as:
P(i\r) = exp(X,p / exp(/r) (3.10)
and
P(r) = exp(Fra + Ir) I Z exp(i> a + 7r-) . (3. 1 1)r'
So far, equations (3.10) and (3.11) simply amount to estimating the 
standard multinomial logit model, because the joint choice of region 
and state has been broken into a conditional probability framework 
(3.7). In a simple NMNL model, a single coefficient on the inclusive 
values can take on a value other than unity; this same factor also scales 
the deterministic component of each stochastic profit function. Thus, 
the simple NMNL model can be written as:
P(i\f) = expf^p/n - o;;/exp(/r) (3.12)
and
P(f) = exp(7ra + (1 - a)/r) / Z exp(yr> a + (1, - a)/r/) , (3.13)
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where the inclusive value is redefined as follows to reflect the scaling 
of the deterministic profit components:
7r = logZexp(X,p/(l-a)).
S£T
When a = 0 or (1 - a) = 1, the simple NMNL model becomes the 
standard multinomial logit model. When a limits to 1 or (1 - a) limits 
to 0, it can be seen from equation (3.13) that the state-specific variables 
imbedded in Ir and // play no role in the selection of region r. In that 
case, the simple NMNL model implies that the choice of region and 
the choice of state within the region are completely separate.
The estimation of the coefficient of the inclusive value will reveal 
whether the IIA property and therefore the standard multinomial logit 
model is appropriate. A coefficient of unity for (1 - a) suggests that 
alternative choices are irrelevant for determining the relative probabili 
ties between any two choices. However, if (1 - a) equals zero, state- 
specific characteristics introduce no interregional dissimilarities at the 
choice of region. Therefore, in the econometric literature, the coeffi 
cient (1 - a) is referred to frequently as the dissimilarity index or dis 
similarity parameter.
McFadden showed that the simple NMNL model is consistent with 
stochastic utility or profit maximization as long as a is between zero 
and unity (see also Daly and Zachary 1978). If the estimated coeffi 
cient value for (1 - a) falls outside of the unit interval or is not between 
zero and unity, the estimated coefficients of the model are not consis 
tent with the profit maximization framework and the estimation model 
may be misspecified. 3
The errors are assumed to follow a generalized extreme-value distri 
bution function that allows the Weibull errors to be correlated among 
states within a region but not among states across regions. Maximizing 
the likelihood function based on the generalized extreme-value distri 
bution function and estimating the parameters simultaneously and not 
sequentially produces full-information. Maximum likelihood estimates 
for a, p and (1 - a) are consistent, asymptotically normally distributed 
and asymptotically efficient (see Hensher 1986).
The third and final estimation model will relax the assumption that 
dissimilarity parameters are constant across regions and permit them to 
vary.
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The Generalized NMNL Model
The final model that we will examine in this section is a nested 
multinomial logit model that allows each region r to have its own dis 
similarity parameter (1 - ar). To simplify the mathematical presenta 
tion, we will follow Borsch-Supan and define
er =i-or .
The joint cumulative distribution function of the ejr 's for this new 
model is given by
F(e) = exp I - 2 [E exp {- e5r } I/8r] flr 1 , (3.14)
where e is the vector of all stochastic components of profits across 
states. The function F is a member of the generalized extreme-value 
class of cumulative distribution functions, and when all 0/s equal one, 
it describes the standard multinomial logit model.
From Theorem 1 of McFadden (1978), the cumulative distribution 




yields the following expression for the probability of choosing a partic 
ular region r
P(r) = exp{yra+er/r}/2exp{yr'(x+er'/r'} (3.15)r'
in the generalized nested multinomial logit model. The conditional 
probability of choosing a particular state i given that its region r has 
been chosen is
P(i|r) = exp(X,P / 8r) / exp (7r). (3.16)
McFadden showed that, in an analogous manner to the simple NMNL, 
each of the dissimilarity parameters 0r in the generalized nested multi 
nomial logit model must be greater than zero and less than or equal to
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one, if the model is to be consistent with stochastic profit or maximiza 
tion.4
To simultaneously estimate a, p, and the dissimilarity parameters, 
we maximize the likelihood function to obtain FIML estimates of the 
parameters which are again consistent, asymptotically normally dis 
tributed, and asymptotically efficient.
We will obtain estimates using all three of the logit models outlined 
above. The results are reported in chapter 4 after a description of the 
data and an outline of the hypotheses to be tested.
NOTES
1. The HA property is often referred to as the red bus-blue bus problem, because the develop 
ment of the standard multinomial logit model is rooted in a choice of transportation mode 
(McFadden 1974). In that context, the IIA property means that the probability of taking a red bus 
relative to the probability of taking a private automobile is independent of whether there also 
exists a close substitute for the red bus, such as a blue bus.
2. The multinomial probit model (MNP) does not impose the IIA assumption, and Hausman 
and Wise (1978) have applied the MNP model to a transit-choice problem. However, when more 
than four choices are involved, such as in our choice from among 48 states, the MNP model 
becomes impractical to apply. See Maddala (1986, p. 62) for a discussion.
3. Borsch-Supan (1990) argues that the condition that the dissimilarity parameter lies in the 
unit interval may be too strong. He shows that economic theory can rule out some values for prof 
its or utility and then the dissimilarity parameter can be somewhat larger than unity without the 
coefficient estimates being inconsistent with the stochastic utility or profit maximization frame 
work.
4. Borsch-Supan©s (1990) criticism about the apparent restrictiveness of the theoretical 
boundaries on the dissimilarity parameter in a simple NMNL model can also be applied to the 
generalized NMNL model case.
4 
Empirical Results and Analysis
In this chapter we present the results from our estimation of the sta 
tistical models discussed in chapter 3. We attempted several specifica 
tions for each of the three logistic models—the standard multinomial 
logit and the simple and generalized nested multinomial logit mod 
els—on a comprehensive data set containing information on the 1,197 
new manufacturing plants built by foreign investing firms in the con 
tiguous United States between 1978 and 1987. The data are described 
in detail, along with the hypotheses that we are interested in testing in 
our statistical analysis.
The estimation results for our preferred model—a standard multino 
mial logit specification with the State of California removed from the 
Mountain-Pacific region and becoming its own region—are presented 
together with the corresponding specification in which California is 
included in the Mountain-Pacific region. We also present a synopsis of 
results, including those for the simple and generalized nested multino 
mial logit models that led to our preferred specification and an analysis 
of the predictive ability of that specification. (A more detailed discus 
sion of the results for the nested multinomial logit models is presented 
in appendix B to this chapter.)
Data and Hypotheses
In this section we outline the foreign investment data used in the sta 
tistical analysis, present the construction of the covariates or explana 
tory variables used in the logits, and describe the expected signs of the 
associated coefficients. The starting point for the foreign investment 
data was the information on the 1,197 new manufacturing plants built 
by foreign investing firms in the contiguous United States from 1978 to 
1987, as recorded by the International Trade Administration (ITA) of 
the U.S. Department of Commerce. Besides information on the country
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of origin, the host state, and the year of the investment, the ITA pro 
vides information on the two-digit SIC classification code for the new 
plant and the investing firm's estimate of the value of the new plant.
We deleted a few observations from our analysis. For example, the 
home countries of the firms are from four continents: Europe, Asia, 
North America, and South America. To maintain a parsimonious analy 
sis of the continent where the foreign investment originated, we 
deleted the observation on the single new plant built by a South Amer 
ican firm; we also deleted a new plant built by a Mexican firm, so that 
in our sample Canadian investors represent the only North American 
home country from which new manufacturing plants in the United 
States originate. Thus, the countries of origin, besides Canada, could 
be classified as coming from two regions, Europe and Asia, with 1,195 
new plants left in the analysis at this point.
In addition, of these 1,195 new plants, 640 investing firms provided 
information on the investment value of the plant. Because we wanted 
to use plant value as one of the explanatory variables, we decided to 
attempt predictions for the missing values. As will be described below, 
we were able to provide predictions for 544 of the 555 missing cases. 
This means that 1,184 new plants were available for use in the logit 
analysis.
In the next subsection we describe the state-specific variables, as 
well as the expected signs for their associated coefficients. We then 
describe the region-specific variables in the following section. An 
exact description of all variables used in the analysis is given in table 
4.1.
State-Specific Variables
We use wage rate, energy cost, population and fiscal information, as 
well as information on agglomeration economies and the proximity of 
the country of origin to the prospective host state to model the location 
choice among states. The right-hand-side variables are measured in 
each state at the time that the new plant is recorded in the ITA data set, 
and thus, the values of the covariates change over time.
In preliminary analysis, we included per capita income and growth 
in per capita income variables, following the lead of other researchers. 
The coefficients for the market variables generally had the wrong signs
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Real average hourly production earnings deflated with the 
GNP deflator. Varies with state and year. Logarithmically 
transformed in specifications. Source: U.S. Department of 
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, State and Area 
Employment, Hours and Earnings, computer tape. 
Two-digit SIC industry employment in state divided by 
total private employment in state. Varies with state, year 
and two-digit SIC code of investing firm. Source: U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
Table SA25, floppy disk.
State Population (in millions). Varies with state and year. 
Logarithmically transformed in specifications. Source: 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, Table SA5, floppy disk. 
Average electric bills (in dollars) for the industrial sector 
(300 KW - 60,000 KWH) in state, deflated with the GNP 
deflator. Varies with state and year. Logarithmically 
transformed in specifications. Source: U.S. Department of 
Energy, Energy Information Administration, Federal Power 
Commission, Typical Electric Bills, selected years. 
Average price per 1000 cubic feet of natural gas (in dollars) 
for the industrial sector in state, deflated with the GNP 
deflator. Varies with state and year. Logarithmically 
transformed in specifications. Source: U.S. Department of 
Energy, Energy Information Administration, Natural Gas 
Annual, selected years.
State and local aid from the federal government, multiplied 
by 100 , then divided by state personal income (obtained 
from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, Table SA5, floppy disk). Varies with state and 
year. Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
the Census, Governmental Finances, selected years. 
State and local deficit defined as direct general 
expenditures minus total general revenues, multiplied by 
100, then divided by state personal income (see above). 
Varies with state and year. Source: U.S. Department of 













State and local health expenditures, multiplied by 100, then 
divided by state personal income (see above). Varies with 
state and year. Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of the Census, Governmental Finances, selected 
years.
State and local highway expenditures, multiplied by 100, 
then divided by state personal income (see above). Varies 
with state and year. Source: U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Governmental Finances, 
selected years.
State and local expenditures for local schools, multiplied 
by 100, then divided by state personal income (see above). 
Varies with state and year. Source: U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Governmental Finances, 
selected years.
State and local higher education expenditures, multiplied 
by 100, then divided by state personal income (see above). 
Varies with state and year. Source: U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Governmental Finances, 
selected years.
Other state and local expenditures, multiplied by 100, then 
divided by state personal income (see above). Varies with 
state and year. Other state and local expenditures computed 
as direct general expenditures minus health, highway, 
primary and secondary education, and higher education 
expenditures. Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of the Census, Governmental Finances, selected 
years.
State and local property tax revenues, multiplied by 100, 
then divided by state personal income (see above). Varies 
with state and year. Source: U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Governmental Finances, 
selected years.
State and local sales tax revenues, multiplied by 100, then 
divided by state personal income (see above). Varies with 
state and year. Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, 







Individual Income Tax State individual income tax revenues, multiplied by 100, 
then divided by state personal income (see above). Varies 
with state and year. Source: U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Governmental Finances, 
selected years.
State and local revenues from user fees and miscellaneous 
charges, multiplied by 100, then divided by state personal 
income (see above). Varies with state and year. Source: 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
Governmental Finances, selected years. 
State corporate income tax revenues, multiplied by 100, 
then divided by state personal income (see above). Varies 
with state and year. Source: U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Bureau of the Census, State Government 
Finances, selected years.
Other state and local revenues, multiplied by 100, then 
divided by state personal income (see above). Varies with 
state and year. Other revenues computed as total revenues 
minus property tax, sales tax, corporate tax, individual 
income tax revenues and user charges. Source: U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
Governmental Finances, selected years. 
Transaction value defined as reported total cost of the 
investment regardless of the source or timing of funds. 
Scale is tens of thousands of dollars. Value is deflated with 
GNP deflator for nonresidential investment. Missing 
values filled in, where possible, with predictions from a 
Box-Cox regression. Varies with investing firm. 
Logarithmically transformed in specifications. Source: 
U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade 
Administration, Foreign Direct Investment in the United 
States, for 1978-1983, computer tape obtained from the 
Department of Commerce; for 1984-1987 entered from 
published data.
Varies with investing firm. It is equal to unity if firm has 
two-digit SIC classification code equal to nn, and is equal 
to zero otherwise.
Attractiveness for SIC 28 This variable varies with state and investing firm. It is
equal to unity if the firm has two-digit SIC classification 
code equal to 28, and the state is Alabama, Delaware, 







Attractiveness for SIC 35 Varies with state and investing firm. It is equal to unity if 
the firm has two-digit SIC classification code equal to 35, 
and the state is Connecticut. It is equal to zero in all other 
cases.










Varies with state and investing firm. It is equal to unity if
the firm has two-digit SIC classification code equal to 37,
and the state is Kentucky, Michigan, or Ohio. It is equal to
zero in all other cases.
Varies with state and investing firm. It is equal to unity if
the firm is Canadian and the state shares a border with
Canada, i.e., the state is Idaho, Maine, Michigan,
Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New York, North
Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Vermont, or Washington. It is
equal to zero otherwise.
Varies with state and the investing firm. It is equal to unity
if the firm is European and the state is on the eastern
seaboard, i.e., the state is Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, or Virginia. It is equal to zero
otherwise.
Varies with state and investing firm. It is equal to unity if
the firm is Asian and the state is on the Western seaboard,
i.e., the state is California, Oregon or Washington. It is
equal to zero otherwise.
Varies with investing firm. It is equal to unity if the firm is
Japanese and equals zero otherwise.
Varies with investing firm. It is equal to unity if the firm is
from the United Kingdom and equals zero otherwise.
Varies with investing firm. It is equal to unity if the firm is
not from Japan or the United Kingdom and is equal to zero
otherwise.
Varies with state and year. It is equal to unity if the state
had a world-wide unitary tax system in place in that year,
i.e., California, Idaho, Illinois, Montana and North Dakota,
1978-87; Colorado, New Hampshire, Oregon and Utah,
1978-85; Massachusetts, 1978-83; and Florida, 1983. It is
equal to zero otherwise.
Varies with investing firm. It is equal to unity if the firm is
European, and is equal to zero otherwise.
Varies with investing firm. It is equal to unity if the firm is
Asian, and is equal to zero otherwise.
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and were not statistically significant. We therefore dropped the income 
variables from the analysis. We believe that market variables are 
important to the decision to invest somewhere in the United States, but 
that state market variables are less important in selecting a specific 
location within the United States. The percentage of the workforce 
unionized is no longer reported on an annual basis, and our initial 
attempts to incorporate a unionization variable constructed from inter 
polation of existing data revealed little significant role for unioniza 
tion. 1 We also estimated models with variables representing the state 
minimum wage laws and right-to-work laws, but the coefficients for 
these variables were also statistically insignificant. We now present the 
state-specific variables used in the final analyses.
Real Wage Rate
We use the state average hourly manufacturing production earnings 
deflated by the GNP deflator in the year that the investment is made to 
represent the cost of labor in the manufacturing sector for the state. 2 In 
preliminary analysis, the real wage rate variable performs better statis 
tically when the values are logarithmically transformed. For a given 
level of productivity, we expect this variable to have a negative effect 
on profits, and therefore on the probability of locating in a given state.
We do not have good measures of labor productivity in each state 
over time, and a productivity variable is not explicitly included in the 
state-level analysis. To the extent that productivity of the workforce 
varies across regions and persists over time, the regional dummy vari 
ables that we include in the regional choice aspect of the location deci 
sion will help account for productivity differentials across regions. 
However, our analysis still does not account for the productivity differ 
ences among states within regions.
Employment Agglomeration
Employment agglomeration economies for manufacturers are mea 
sured as state employment in the two-digit SIC industry of the new 
plant as a fraction of total private employment in the state. Manufac 
turing firms are expected to be more attracted to states with higher con 
centrations of employees in their industry.
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State Population
Although our employment agglomeration variable will capture the 
effect of the fraction of the workforce in the industry of the new plant, 
it will not capture the effect of the absolute size of the workforce. To 
this end, we included the logarithm of population in our specifications. 
We expect the probability of choosing a state to increase with popula 
tion.
Energy Costs
Average real industrial electric energy bills in the state, deflated 
using the implicit GNP price index for private total consumption, were 
used to measure the electric costs in the state. Nominal natural gas 
prices per 1,000 cubic feet are deflated using the same GNP deflator as 
for electric bills. Both variables are logarithmically transformed in the 
specifications.
In preliminary runs, the energy cost variables were not statistically 
significant. We therefore test whether energy prices affected locations 
of plants for two major industry groups, Chemicals and Allied Prod 
ucts (SIC 28) and Primary Metals (SIC 33), that use energy intensively. 
Accordingly, the energy variables are interacted with two dummy vari 
ables representing these two industries. The first dummy equals unity 
when the new plant is built for industry group 28 and zero otherwise. 
The second equals unity when the new plant is built for industry group 
33 and zero otherwise. We expect higher energy costs to decrease the 
probability of firms from these two major industry groups locating in a 
state.
State Attractiveness
State attractiveness is represented by a set of indicator variables 
meant to capture foreign industry-specific agglomeration economies 
and other industry-specific economies not directly related to the level 
of employment. A state is deemed to be attractive to a particular indus 
try group if, out of the 1,197 original observations on new plants, it has 
more than eight new plants in that industry group and the number of 
new plants for that industry group represented more than 30 percent of 
the total for the time period 1978-87. This formula leads to state attrac 
tiveness indicators representing three industry groups. If a new plant
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for the Chemicals and Allied Products industry group is built in Ala 
bama, Delaware, Louisiana, New Jersey, or Texas, the first indicator 
variable has a value of unity and a value of zero otherwise. The second 
indicator variable has a value of unity if the new plant is in the industry 
group Industrial Machinery and Equipment and the plant is located in 
Connecticut and has a value of zero otherwise. The third indicator vari 
able has a value of unity, if a new plant for the industry group Trans 
portation Equipment is built in Kentucky, Michigan, or Ohio and has a 
value of zero otherwise. Naturally, we expect state attractiveness to 
increase the probability of locating in the state.
The state attractiveness variables are our attempt to correct for so- 
called "spikes" in the residuals even after all the right-hand-side vari 
ables are included in the model. The corrections may appear ad hoc 
and we have not developed ironclad explanations for each of the three 
indicators. However, we have mentioned the tendency of Japanese 
firms in particular to locate near suppliers (see chapter 1) and to 
develop vertically integrated relationships among suppliers and 
between suppliers and the manufacturing assembly plant. Such prac 
tices breed regional agglomeration beyond what the standard set of 
state-level covariates, such as wage rates and domestic agglomeration 
economies, can explain. The location practices will then necessitate 
additional variables in the model.
At least the third indicator variable lends itself to the above explana 
tion for the attractiveness variable. Most of the new plants in the trans 
portation equipment major group are in the automobile manufacturing 
industry or are in the parts supplier aspect of that major group. The 
new plants are heavily concentrated in three of what Woodward (1992) 
names the auto-alley states—Kentucky, Michigan, and Ohio. Appar 
ently the agglomeration variable for Transportation Equipment already 
included as a covariate in our model does not account fully for the 
heavy concentration of new foreign transportation equipment plants in 
these three states. We speculate that the high reliance of foreign firms 
on a hand-selected set of suppliers accounts for the special attractive 
ness of transportation equipment plants to those three states. Explana 
tions for the other two concentrations are not as obvious to us, 
however.
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State Proximity
Based on the location patterns examined in chapter 2, we use three 
sets of interactive indicator variables to capture the probable prefer 
ence for states located nearer the foreign investor's home country. If 
the investor is a Canadian firm, the first set of indicators are unity for 
states bordering Canada (see table 4.1 for an exact definition), and zero 
otherwise. A second set of indicators have a value of unity when a 
European investor builds a new plant in a state on the eastern seaboard 
(see table 4.1 for an exact definition) and have a value of zero other 
wise. The third set of indicators have a value of unity when an Asian 
investor builds a new plant on the western seaboard, i.e., in Washing 
ton, Oregon, or California, and are zero otherwise. We expect that the 
proximity of a state will increase the probability of locating there.
The state proximity variables are also somewhat ad hoc in nature 
and result from the location patterns observed in the maps in chapter 2. 
The question we raise is whether the location patterns are explained by 
the right-hand-side covariates described above and the fiscal variables 
that follow, or whether proximity to home country adds another dimen 
sion to the location decision.
Proximity to the home country might be important if executives reg 
ularly travel from the parent to the foreign plant. For example, an exec 
utive located at a parent corporation in Japan would fly nonstop from 
Tokyo to Los Angeles and take a corporate jet directly to the city else 
where in California. The extra travel time from Los Angeles would be 
short. However, if the plant were located in North Carolina, the same 
executive flying from Tokyo would probably add at least one other 
commercial flight to the trip. The extra travel might take another five or 
six hours in the air in each direction. Moreover, the trip adds to fatigue, 
requires more adjustment to time zone differences, and adds probably a 
day to the executive's itinerary. For all those reasons, parent firms may 
favor locations in states that are closer to the home country, other 
things about equal. The same general reasoning applies to European or 
Canadian parent firms.
Fiscal Variables
Most research on this topic to date has included total taxes or a par 
tial list of taxes as variables in the location models. The tax variable
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specification in this literature is generally an incomplete representation 
of the fiscal impacts of location decisions for two reasons. Firms may 
react differentially to various taxes, suggesting the disaggregation of 
the total tax variable into its component taxes. In addition, most exist 
ing empirical models either ignore the expenditure side of the budget 
or include only a partial list of expenditure variables. To remedy these 
problems, we include expenditures and taxes in the equation using 
state and local budget constraints. The state and local budget constraint 
includes expenditures, taxes, and the deficit all specified per $100 of 
state personal income. The budget constraint is as follows:
Z EXP, - [Z TAXES, + USER + AID] = DEFICIT 
where
EXP, = state and local expenditure per $100 of state personal 
income on various functions,
TAX, = state and local tax variables per $100 of state personal 
income,
USER = user charges and other revenues per $100 of state per 
sonal income,
AID = federal aid to state and local governments in the state 
per $100 of state personal income, and
DEFICIT = currrent account deficit per $100 of state personal 
income.
The advantage of the budget constraint is that it enables us to 
include expenditures, taxes, user fees, intergovernmental aid, and the 
deficit 3 By obtaining coefficients for each variable, we can simulate 
more accurately than others the effect of raising a tax or increasing 
expenditure. For example, a tax increase may fund an increase in 
expenditure or a reduction in the deficit, or an increase in intergovern 
mental aid can be used to reduce taxes, raise spending, or lower the 
deficit.
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To be more specific, on the expenditure side, we include variables 
for health, highways, primary and secondary education, higher educa 
tion, and other expenditures. On the tax side, we include variables for 
property, sales, individual income, corporate income, and other taxes 
in our empirical analysis.
A feature of the budget constraint, as it is implemented here, needs 
additional explanation. All of the expenditure and revenue items can 
not be incorporated as right-hand-side variables into a properly identi 
fied empirical model, because the budget constraint would create exact 
collinearity among the fiscal variables. Therefore, we arbitrarily elimi 
nate state and local welfare expenditures from the variables used in the 
empirical analysis, as do other researchers using the budget constraint.
The omission of the welfare expenditure variable affects the inter 
pretation of the coefficients of the other fiscal variables, however. For 
example, an increase in a tax variable, holding all other values of the 
included fiscal variables constant, including the deficit, would have to 
be used to fund an increase in welfare expenditures. Therefore, a nega 
tive coefficient on a tax variable would mean that an increase in the tax 
to fund an offsetting amount of higher welfare expenditures would 
reduce the probability of a plant location in a state. A positive tax coef 
ficient, on the other hand, suggests that a higher tax to fund welfare 
expenditures increases the probability of a foreign plant location in the 
state. One can also examine the effect of different combinations of tax 
increases and expenditure increases in nonwelfare categories of expen 
diture, which has the effect of holding welfare expenditure constant. 
For example, one can ask the effect of increasing sales taxes by $1 per 
$100 of personal income to reduce the deficit by $1 per $100 of per 
sonal income by comparing the coefficients on the deficit and the sales 
tax variables.
Corporate Tax Complications
As discussed in chapter 2, corporate taxation of multinational firms 
has a number of extra dimensions that we need to account for in our 
model. For example, corporate income taxes could have different 
affects on foreign plant locations when home countries operate resi 
dential as opposed to territorial tax systems. To account for the differ 
ential effects, we interact the corporate income tax variable with each 
of three dummy variables that represent investors from Japan, inves-
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tors from the United Kingdom, and investors from other countries. 
Using these interaction dummies with the corporate income tax vari 
able, we analyze whether the corporate income tax affects investors 
differently across countries.4 Investors in the other country category 
are likely to be from countries operating territorial tax systems in 
which the investors pay only host country taxes. Investors from territo- 
rial-tax-system countries may be more sensitive to host country taxes 
than investors from countries operating a residential tax system.
The second feature of the corporate income tax variable specifica 
tion involves the allocation of the firm's corporate income among the 
states. Firms operating plants both outside and inside of the state typi 
cally must allocate income to each state taxing entity using a formula 
determined by each state. States also determine the total amount of 
income eligible for allocation. During the 1978 to 1987 period, several 
states used worldwide profits as a basis for allocating income to the 
state (referred to above as worldwide unitary tax states). From the 
states' perspective, a worldwide income tax basis significantly reduces 
opportunities for firms to use transfer pricing to lower income subject 
to taxation. Firms, however, generally prefer a domestic, rather than 
the worldwide unitary or a domestic combination system as a basis for 
allocating profits to states. The empirical issue here is whether inves 
tors tend to avoid states that use worldwide unitary taxation.
To test the effect of worldwide unitary taxation, we interact the cor 
porate income tax variable with a dummy variable representing the 
states with a worldwide unitary tax system in the year of the invest 
ment, and then interact the new variable with dummy variables repre 
senting the investor's home country, as above. Thus, up to three 
variables represent the unitary tax variable: the real corporate tax per 
$100 of state personal income interacted with the state unitary tax 
dummy interacted with Japan as the home country of the investor, the 
real corporate tax variable interacted with the state unitary tax dummy 
interacted with the United Kingdom as the home country of the inves 
tor, and the real corporate tax variable interacted with the state unitary 
tax dummy interacted with the indicator for another country as the 
home country of the investor.5
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Region-Specific Variables
To get at regional choice, we began by grouping states into five 
regions, combining the Bureau of Economic Analysis region defini 
tions in some cases. The Mountain and Pacific states—Arizona, Cali 
fornia, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, 
Utah, Washington, and Wyoming—formed one region, which we 
called Mountain-Pacific;6 the West South Central states—Arkansas, 
Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas—formed the second region, while the 
balance of the southern states—Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, 
Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, West Virginia, and Virginia—were grouped into a third 
region, which we identified as South. The New England and Middle 
Atlantic states—Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont— 
formed a fourth region, which we called Northeast. The East and West 
North Central states—Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Min 
nesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and 
Wisconsin—were grouped into a fifth region called Midwest. The Mid 
west region will represent the baseline region. In other words, the 
region-specific component of deterministic profit equals zero for the 
Midwest region for all years, and the region-specific component of 
deterministic profit for all other regions is expressed as a deviation 
from zero.
In the standard multinomial logit models (and the simple nested 
multinomial logit models) that we estimated, there are 16 variables that 
directly affect the choice of region, four sets of variables for each of 
the four regions (excluding the baseline region).7 Three sets describe 
U.S. regional location interaction with the world region of the investor. 
The first set represents the U.S. region-specific constants, and there are 
four indicator variables for this set—one corresponding to each of the 
United States regions. In the deterministic component of profit for state 
5, the indicator variable corresponding to the region r in which state s 
is located is equal to unity, while the remaining indicators equal zero. 
The second set determines the differential attractiveness of the regions 
for European investors. The four indicator variables in this set equal 
the four region-specific constants when the investing firm is European, 
and they are all equal to zero otherwise. The third set determines the
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differential attractiveness of the regions for Asian investors. This case 
is completely analogous to the previous case, except that the indicators 
can be nonzero only when the investing firm is Asian. Canadian firms 
represent the base case, and no regional attractiveness indicators are 
included for Canada.
The fourth set of variables gives the effect of investment size on 
regional preference. The four variables here are given by the products 
of the logarithm of the real investment size (transaction value) with the 
four indicator variables defining the region-specific constants. Of the 
1,195 new plants in our original data, 640 transaction values were 
reported. For 544 of the remaining 555 cases, predictions could be sub 
stituted from a Box-Cox regression of real transaction value on indica 
tors for year, country of origin, and two-digit SIC code using the 640 
reported values. The method used to predict the missing values is given 
in detail in appendix A to this chapter.
An interpretation of the coefficients for the regional variables is dis 
cussed here. For our data, we have defined three world regions as the 
source of new plant investments—Canada, Europe, and Asia—locating 
in one of the defined U.S. regions. The omitted dummy variable cate 
gories are Canada and the Midwest region of the United States. Thus, 
the coefficient on the variable corresponding to region r in the region- 
specific constant group gives the difference in profit between region r 
and the Midwest region for Canadian firms, holding transaction value 
constant. The sum of the coefficients on the constant and on the Europe 
dummy corresponding to region r gives the difference in profit 
between region r and the Midwest region for European firms, holding 
transaction value constant. The sum of the coefficients on the variables 
corresponding to region r for the constant and the Asia dummy gives 
the difference in profit between region r and the Midwest region for 
Asian firms, holding transaction value constant. Finally, the coefficient 
on the investment size variable corresponding to region r gives the dif 
ference in profit between region r and the Midwest region due to the 
logarithm of investment size for a given firm.
The results of the estimations are presented in the next section.
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Results from the Standard Multinomial Logit Model
Before we move to the results proper, some preliminaries are in 
order. All the logit estimation in this chapter was carried out using the 
Davidon-Fletcher-Powell subroutine from version 3 of the GQOPT 
subroutine package. The computing was carried out on the IBM 3090 
mainframe at Syracuse University and the IBM 3090 supercomputer at 
Cornell University. First and second derivatives of the log-likelihood 
function used in the estimation process were numerically approxi 
mated by GQOPT by means of first and second differences. The diago 
nal of the negative inverse of the approximated second derivative 
matrix provides asymptotically correct variances for the parameter 
estimates. Standard errors are computed as the square roots of these 
variances and asymptotically correct f-statistics are given by the ratio 
of the parameter estimate (less its hypothesized value) to the standard 
error. The appropriate number of degrees of freedom for the f-statistic 
is infinite, making our tests equivalent to the usual normal hypothesis 
tests where the standard errors are known.
There are two types of hypothesis tests concerning a single parame 
ter with which we must be concerned. In the first type, we have no 
prior expectation about the sign of the parameter, and a two-tailed test 
is appropriate. In this case, whenever the r-statistic is greater than 1.96 
(2.576) in absolute value, we reject the null hypothesis in favor of the 
alternative at the 5 percent (1 percent) level. In the second type of test, 
we have expectations about the sign of the parameter, and a one-tailed 
test is appropriate. If the estimated and anticipated signs are the same, 
we reject the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative at the 5 percent 
(1 percent) level if the absolute value of the /-statistic is greater than 
1.645 (2.327). However, we do not reject the null hypothesis if the esti 
mated sign of the parameter is different than the anticipated sign.
The final preliminary point concerns the interpretation of the param 
eter estimates. A positive coefficient on a given variable has the obvi 
ous interpretation of an increase in the firm's profit in a given state due 
to a unit increase in the given variable. Unfortunately, the profit nature 
of this interpretation is not very appealing; a probabilistic interpreta 
tion would be preferable. To this end, we introduce three variants of the
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elasticity of the state selection probability with respect to a given vari 
able.
Strictly speaking, the elasticity of the state selection probability with 
respect to a given continuous variable is defined to be the percentage 
change in the state selection probability due to a 1 percent change in 
the continuous variable. We use this definition of elasticity when the 
continuous variable is logarithmically transformed in the deterministic 
component of profit, calling it a Type I elasticity. Then, if we denote 
the continuous variable by x, its associated coefficient by 7 and the 
state selection probability by Pq, the Type I elasticity is given by
e* = Y(l-fy (4.D
in the standard multinomial logit model. Unfortunately, when the con 
tinuous variable is not logarithmically transformed, the Type I defini 
tion of elasticity entails an expression that depends on the value of x. In 
the case where the continuous variable is not logarithmically trans 
formed, we shall define the selection probability elasticity to be the 
percentage change in the state selection probability due to a unit 
change in x. We shall call this a Type II elasticity. The formula for the 
Type II elasticity in the standard multinomial logit model is identical to 
that of the Type I elasticity in equation (4.1). The last case to be consid 
ered is when x is an indicator (dummy-type) variable. In this case, 
interpretations based on derivatives are not possible. If we let Pql 
denote the value of the state selection probability when the indicator is 
unity and Pq° the value of the probability when the indicator is zero, 
our Type III elasticity is defined to be the difference Pql minus Pq°, as a 
proportion ofPq°. The formula for this elasticity is
e* = (exp(Y)-!)(!-/») (4.2)
in the standard multinomial logit model. 8 It remains to choose values at 
which to evaluate the state selection probabilities. One reasonable 
value is the reciprocal of 48 (0.021), the theoretical mean value of the 
probability. A second reasonable value is the sample mean probability 
for California. Of the 1,184 new plants in our sample, 120 are located 
in California, giving a sample proportion of 0.101. Other values will be 
introduced as they are used.
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Which Logit Model
Our specification search started with the standard multinomial logit 
and simple nested multinomial logit models that incorporated all of the 
state-specific variables (including the variables for proximity to home 
country or continent) and the region-specific variables for four of the 
five regions constructed. In both the multinomial logit and simple 
nested logit models, the proximity variables performed strongly and 
indicated that proximity was a positive attractive force. However, in 
the simple nested logit model, the estimated value of the common dis 
similarity parameter exceeded unity and therefore violated the Daly- 
Zachary-McFadden condition for consistency with stochastic profit 
maximization. The amount that the dissimilarity parameter exceeded 
unity decreased when the proximity variables were dropped from the 
analysis. Accordingly, we decided to delete the proximity variables 
from the generalized nested multinomial logit specifications that we 
attempted. The results from the generalized nested multinomial logit 
specifications suggested a model in which California was separated 
from the Mountain-Pacific region (see appendix A to this chapter for 
more details). Because the added complexity of the region-specific dis 
similarity parameters detracted from the explanatory power of the 
covariates, we returned finally to the standard multinomial logit model. 
The nested logit results also suggested that the HA assumption was not 
violated and the standard multinomial logit model is appropriate for 
estimating our model.
The mean values of the right-hand-side covariates are listed in table 
4.2. We can now analyze the empirical results for the standard multino 
mial logit model, which are presented in table 4.3. The column labeled 
Model I contains the results for the preferred specification in which 
California has been removed from the Mountain-Pacific region and the 
column labeled Model II contains the results in the case where Califor 
nia is included in the Mountain-Pacific region.
Wage Rates and Energy Costs
The wage rate variable and the four energy cost variables performed 
rather poorly in both Models I and II. Several of these variables did 
well, however, in several preliminary specifications of the estimation 
models in which we included fewer right-hand-side covariates. All of
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Table 4.2 Selected Variable Means Over the Period 1987-1987
Real Wage (real dollars/hour)
Population (millions)
Real Electric Bill (real dollars)
Real Gas Bill (real dollars/1000 
cubic feet)
Intergovernmental Aid (cents/dollar 
state personal income)
Deficit (cents/dollar state personal 
income)
Health Expenditures (cents/dollar 
state personal income)
Highway Expenditures (cents/dol 
lar state personal income)
Primary and Secondary Education 
Expenditures (cents/dollar state 
personal income)
Higher Education Expendiutres 
(cents/dollar state personal income)
Other Expenditures (cents/dollar 
state personal income)
Property Tax (cents/dollar state per 
sonal income)
Sales Tax (cents/dollar state per 
sonal income)
Individual Income Tax (cents/dollar 
state personal income)
User Charges (cents/dollar state 
personal income)
Corporate Tax (cents/dollar state 
personal income)

























































Table 43 Comparison of Two Sets of Multinomial Logit Results for State 






Log Real Electric Bill x SIC 28
Log Real Electric Bill x SIC 33
Log Real Gas Bill x SIC 28
Log Real Gas Bill x SIC 33
Attractiveness for SIC 28
Attractiveness for SIC 35
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these were expected to have negative coefficients, but none was signif 
icant even at the 5 percent level. (In fact, the coefficient on the real 
electric bill is significant at the 5 percent level for firms with two-digit 
SIC code 28, Chemicals and Allied Products, in Model II and almost 
significant at that level in Model I.)
There are at least a couple of reasons for this generally poor statisti 
cal performance. First, a higher wage rate is likely to deter state selec 
tion only when labor productivity is held equal. Unfortunately, while 
our regional indicator variables account for productivity differences 
among regions, our only measure of productivity differences among 
states is rather indirect—state expenditures on higher education (rela 
tive to state personal income) at the time of the investment. This may 
be an insufficient control for productivity differences. In our review of 
the literature (chapter 2), we found the evidence mixed on whether 
wage rates affect location decisions. In fact, other research on FDI 
location has infrequently found wages a significant determinant of 
location. The domestic location literature produces more mixed results 
for wages.
For the energy cost variables, at least part of the problem may be 
that we have only electric bill information and not costs per unit of 
electricity. The electric bill information will be a less appropriate mea 
sure of energy prices to the extent that the composition of energy- 
intensive manufacturing firms varies across states. Locations of 
energy-intensive plants would theoretically be more sensitive to higher 
state energy prices than other plants. Nonetheless, energy costs are less 
important as location determinants generally in research done on loca 
tion choices in 1980 or later.
Employment Agglomeration and State Population
The results for industry-specific employment agglomeration and the 
logarithm population are extremely strong in both Models I and II. For 
Model I, holding employment agglomeration constant, the Type I elas 
ticity for population is 1.141 evaluated at the mean probability of 0.021 
and 1.047 evaluated at the sample proportion for California. On the 
other hand, holding population constant, the Type II elasticity of indus 
try-specific employment agglomeration is 14.806 at the mean probabil 
ity and 13.588 at the value for California. The calculations are similar
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for Model II. These findings are consistent with other research on the 
locations of both domestic and foreign manufacturing plants. In addi 
tion to a suggestion that plants find advantages in locations at which 
other plants in its industry group have located, the findings reinforce 
the view that foreign plants tend to locate in states that already have a 
higher concentration of industry in their major group, especially for the 
four industries that dominate the new foreign manufacturing plants in 
our sample. Thus, foreign plants tend to build on the traditional 
strengths in the state. However, those traditional industries may be 
declining or growing within the state; our research sheds little light on 
the issue of whether foreign plants replace declining industries or com 
pete with domestic growth industries. The answer to that question is 
likely to vary by industry with Transportation Equipment and Indus 
trial Equipment yielding different results.
State Attractiveness
All three state attractiveness variables have positive coefficients that 
are statistically significant at the 1 percent level in both Models I and 
II. Type III elasticities for these variables give the percentage differ 
ence in the selection probability in moving from an industry that is not 
specially attracted to the state to an industry that is. Texas held a spe 
cial attraction for the Chemicals and Allied Products (SIC 28) group. 
In our sample, the sample proportion for a firm choosing Texas was 88/ 
1184 or 0.074. Accordingly, the Type III elasticity for the Chemicals 
and Allied Products group, evaluated at the sample proportion for 
Texas, is 1.238. Connecticut was attractive to the Industrial Machinery 
and Equipment (SIC 35) group. Our sample proportion for a firm 
choosing Connecticut was 39/1184 or 0.033. This value implies a Type 
III elasticity for the Industrial Machinery and Equipment group of 
1.635 when evaluated at the value for Connecticut. Finally, Michigan 
was especially attractive to the Transportation Equipment group (SIC 
37). The sample proportion for a firm choosing Michigan was 31/1184 
or 0.026. This value gives rise to a Type III elasticity for the Transpor 
tation Equipment group of 1.844, when evaluated at the Michigan 
value. As discussed earlier, these variables were added to account for 
spikes in our distribution of residuals in initial multinomial logit runs. 
We believe that the variables account for agglomeration economies and
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location practices related to vertical integration of manufacturing at 
different plants that are not captured in our more traditional agglomer 
ation economy measure.
Fiscal Variables
Some of the tax and expenditure variables are significant at the 5 
percent level. Excluding for the moment the corporate tax variables, 
we find, for both Models I and II, statistical significance in the 
expected direction for intergovernmental aid, the deficit variable, and 
higher education expenditures at the 1 percent level, and for user 
charges at the 5 percent level. In Model II only, other taxes are signifi 
cant at the 5 percent level in the expected direction. The case of high 
way expenditures is moot. To the extent that highway expenditures are 
considered beneficial like any other expenditures, we would expect its 
associated coefficient to be positive. However, to the extent that higher 
expenditures on highways reflect a general state of disrepair, we might 
expect the coefficient to be negative. The coefficient for highway 
expenditures in Model I is negative and significant at the 10 percent 
level based on a two-tailed test.
Evaluating at the mean probability 0.021, the relevant Type II elas 
ticities in Model I are 0.295 for intergovernmental aid, -0.381 for a def 
icit increase, 0.671 for an increase in higher education expenditures, 
and -0.336 for an increase in user charges, while the Type II elasticity 
for other taxes in Model II is -0.242. Evaluating at the sample propor 
tion for California, 0.101, the elasticities in Model I are 0.270 for inter 
governmental aid, -0.350 for the deficit, 0.616 for higher education 
expenditures, and -0.308 for user charges; the elasticity value for other 
taxes in Model II is -0.222. The values for higher education expendi 
tures are both quite high, and demonstrate the concern foreign inves 
tors have for future productivity of the workforce.
Corporate Taxes
Of the two corporate tax variables in each of our final models, the 
amount of corporate tax revenue as a proportion of state personal 
income is significant at the 1 percent level in both Models I and II. The 
Type II elasticity of the corporate tax in Model I is -0.567, evaluated at 
the mean probability. Evaluating at the sample proportion for Califor-
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nia (and including the unitary tax system coefficient), the elasticity 
reaches -0.758. The large effect of corporate taxes on location is sur 
prising in light of other foreign plant location studies that find only 
weak (at best) locational effects for the corporate tax variable. Our 
more complete specification of the government's budget constraint and 
the addition of expenditure and taxes in a consistent manner apparently 
improved on the estimation precision for the effects of fiscal variables 
on the location of foreign plants. The lack of significance for the uni 
tary tax system variables (even though it is close to significant at the 5 
percent level in Model II) indicates that foreign firms were not uni 
formly concerned about this aspect of the tax system throughout the 
1978-87 period. Because plants locate in areas for what is expected to 
be the long run, the reduction in the number of states using the world 
wide unitary tax system during the 1980s appears to have reduced its 
significance as a location deterrent, compared to the findings of other 
studies.
Bar charts for the elasticities for the state-specific covariates are pre 
sented in figures 4.1 and 4.2. Figure 4.1 contains the results evaluated 
at the mean probability 0.021, while the results are evaluated at the 
sample proportion for California in figure 4.2.
Region-Specific Variables
In preliminary analysis, we included the state proximity variables 
discussed earlier in the specifications, and they were always significant 
at the 5 percent level. As explained above, these variables were 
removed from the final analysis because the determination of proxim 
ity is somewhat arbitrary and because they resulted in estimates of dis 
similarity parameters that were not consistent with stochastic profit 
maximization. When state proximity variables were included in the 
preliminary specifications, regional preferences inferred from the 
region-specific variables would be interpreted as being net of effects 
due to proximity. When, in the final analysis, state proximity variables 
are excluded from the specification, regional preferences inferred from 
the region-specific variables include effects due to proximity.
Tlirning first to the log real transaction value variable, we note that 
the associated coefficient for the Northeast is negative and significant 
at the 1 percent level in both Model I and Model II, indicating again
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that larger investments from all world regions have a higher probabil 
ity of locating in the Midwest (the excluded indicator variable cate 
gory) than in the Northeast. For example, the sample proportion for 
firms locating in New York is 81/1184 or 0.068. But the Type I elastic 
ity with respect to the real transaction value for locating in New York is 
-0.279. In California, on the other hand, for Model I (with California 
separated from the Mountain-Pacific region) the transaction value 
coefficient is significantly positive at the 5 percent level for the Moun 
tain-Pacific region. The finding indicates that larger investments are 
more attracted to the Mountain-Pacific region, excluding California, 
than the Midwest region. The sample proportion for firms locating in 
Washington State is 23/1184 or 0.019. Accordingly, the Type I elastic 
ity with respect to the real transaction value for locating in Washington 
is 0.255.
The region-specific constants are significant consistently across 
models I and II. In general, firms prefer the South and Northeast to 
other regions of the United States, when transaction values are held 
constant. European firms prefer the Midwest to the Northeast, the 
Mountain-Pacific, and California regions, holding real transaction 
value constant. European firms are indifferent between the Midwest 
region and the remaining southern regions of the United States. Asian 
firms tend to avoid the Northeast and the South compared to the Mid 
west as locations, all else equal. Moreover, these results suggest Asian 
investors have no particular preferences for California over the Mid 
west. That result is somewhat surprising in light of our observation in 
chapter 2 that Japanese manufacturing was heavily concentrated in 
California during the 1978 to 1987 period. However, given the empiri 
cal results reported here, we are led to conclude that once agglomera 
tion economies, population, wage and energy costs, and fiscal variables 
are accounted for, there is little over and above these that Asian firms 
find attractive in California.
Predictive Ability
In the next chapter we use the coefficient results from Model I to 
perform simulation experiments in which we estimate the effects of 
changing policy variables on the probability of locating in a particular 
state. We perform the simulations using the data for the entire 1978 to
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1987 period of analysis, for 1979, and for 1987. However, before we 
examine state-specific results from simulations, it is useful to know 
how well the estimated model predicts location outcomes or probabili 
ties of location in various states.
To judge the predictive precision of the estimated model, we com 
pare the model's predicted values for states to the baseline or actual 
probabilities. The baseline is calculated for 1979, for example, as the 
actual percentages of the 173 total foreign manufacturing plants in 
1979 that located in each state. Thus, the baseline percentages should 
sum to 100. Analogous methods are used to estimate baseline location 
percentages for each state in 1987 and for the overall sample. We then 
difference the model's predicted percentage of firms locating in each 
state and the baseline figure for each state to obtain the prediction 
error. A positive value for the prediction error means that the model 
overpredicts the frequency with which firms select the given state dur 
ing the given time period, while a negative value for the prediction 
error means that the model underpredicts the same frequency.
One striking feature of the results, which are presented in table 4.4 
(with outliers offset from the column of numbers under the heading 
"prediction error"), is that, for the entire sample period, states with the 
highest sample proportions (actual percentage) have the lowest relative 
prediction errors, where relative prediction error is defined as the pre 
diction error divided by the actual percentage. This occurs because the 
maximum likelihood estimation technique produces the best fit overall 
by fitting the states with the highest sample proportions most exactly. It 
is for this reason that California, which has the highest actual percent 
age over the period 1978-1987, has a prediction error close to 0 per 
cent. The states with the three next highest actual percentages, Texas, 
North Carolina, and New York, also have small relative prediction 
errors for the period 1978-1987.
The first exception is Georgia, the state with the fifth highest actual 
percentage. For the period 1978-1987, the model underpredicts the rel 
ative frequency for Georgia by close to 2.5 percentage points. The only 
other state with an underprediction of more than 1 percentage point for 
the entire sample period is Connecticut. We may conclude that Georgia 
and Connecticut hold a special attraction to foreign firms building new 
plants that is not captured by our covariates. Turning to overpredic- 
tions of the relative frequency, two southern states, Florida and Missis-
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sippi, are among the three states with overpredictions of more than 1 
percent for the entire sample period (the third state is Massachusetts). 
One possible explanation for the results for Florida and Mississippi is 
the omission in our model of controls for interracial relations, and pos 
sibly crime associated with a pervasive underclass.
If the relative frequency for a state is substantially overpredicted 
(underpredicted) over the entire sample period, then it is reasonable to 
expect that their actual percentages will be overpredicted in each of the 
years 1979 and 1987. In fact, this pattern holds for all three southern 
states mentioned—Georgia, Florida, and Mississippi. For Georgia, 
there are underpredictions in excess of 3 percentage points in both 
1979 and 1987. For both Florida and Mississippi, there are overpredic 
tions in excess of 1.5 percentage points in each of 1979 and 1987. In 
the case of Massachusetts, the prediction error is moderate (if not 
small) for 1979, but is greater than 2 percentage points for 1987. 
Although it is not the only conclusion consistent with the prediction 
error pattern for Massachusetts, one strongly suspects that the quality 
of the predictions for Massachusetts deteriorate as the sample period 
progresses.
There is a final possibility that should be examined. A state might 
have a relatively low absolute prediction error over the entire period, 
yet have a relatively high absolute prediction error in each of the two 
years we examine. There are two reasons that this might occur. The 
first reason is a naturally high variance for the prediction error of a 
given state. The second possible reason is the omission of economic 
factors from the model that might distinguish the state of affairs in the 
early part of the period, when the economy performed relatively 
poorly, from the state of affairs in the latter part of the period, when the 
economy performed relatively well. If the second reason is to be con 
sidered valid for a particular state, we would almost certainly expect 
the prediction errors to be of opposite signs in 1979 and 1987. Of the 
seven states not yet mentioned in this analysis that have prediction 
errors greater than 1 percent in absolute value in both years, the pattern 
of a sign switch holds for six of them: California, Connecticut, Dela 
ware, Louisiana, Ohio, and Texas. Only Pennsylvania, which had posi 
tive prediction errors in excess of 2 percentage points in 1979 and 
1987, did not have a sign switch.
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It is hard to suggest definite criteria for an acceptable level of pre 
dictive power for a model. The most one can hope for is an insight into 
the possible deficiencies of a model. Our preferred model seriously 
overpredicts for two states with high racial tensions and/or a high 
crime rate, Florida and Mississippi. It also demonstrates a high predic 
tion error variance (that may or may not be related to changing eco 
nomic conditions over the sample period) for eight other states: 
California, Connecticut, Delaware, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, and Texas.
Summary And Conclusions
In the previous studies on business location decisions, both gener 
ally and specifically those that restricted their attention to activity by 
foreign firms, there has been little consensus on the determinants of 
these decisions. Conclusions concerning the effects of wages, energy 
costs, and local tax structure have been mixed. There is considerable 
agreement that agglomeration is an important factor in determining 
where businesses locate.
In this chapter, we have empirically examined which factors deter 
mine the state location of new plants built by foreign firms. Using stan 
dard and nested multinomial logit analysis, we estimated several 
specifications and variants on a data set collected by the International 
Trade Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce, spanning 
the period from 1978 to 1987. Our results indicate that wage rates and 
energy costs are not important determinants of the location decision, 
although we acknowledge that these results may be artifacts of insuffi 
cient productivity controls for labor productivity in the first case and 
unreliable electricity cost data in the second case. As in previous stud 
ies, we found agglomeration to be important, but also discovered a 
strong effect for the absolute population level.
We found that investors from certain world regions eschewed partic 
ular regions of the United States, apparently because of the distances 
between them. In preliminary analysis, we did, however, find proxim 
ity to be an important determinant of the location decision, but noted 
that including proximity variables exacerbated the problem of satisfy-
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ing the technical condition of consistency with stochastic utility maxi 
mization in the nested logits. In the nested logit framework, we found 
evidence to suggest that California should be considered its own region 
and that there may be problems attendant with grouping all the states 
from the New England and Middle Atlantic Census regions into a sin 
gle region for purposes of analysis.
We move finally to our results for state fiscal structure. We found 
several components of state revenues and state expenditures to be 
important determinants of where the foreign firms locate their new 
plants. Higher deficits were a negative factor. Particularly important on 
the expenditure side was higher education, reflecting firms' interest in 
maintaining or increasing labor productivity. On the revenue side, 
higher user charges worked significantly against state selection. For 
eign firms also reacted negatively to higher corporate income taxes. On 
the other hand, worldwide unitary tax systems in the host state were 
not an important negative factor.
In the next chapter, we simulate the effects of changes in state policy 
on the number of foreign firms that choose to locate new plants in that 
state.
Empirical Results and Analysis 107
Appendix A to Chapter 4 
Box-Cox Estimation of Missing Real Transaction Values
As discussed in the text, 555 of our remaining 1,195 observations in the 
ITA data have missing values for the real transaction value or the real amount 
of the investment. We use a Box-Cox method to estimate an equation from 
which to predict the missing real transaction values.
The Box-Cox regression methodology, developed by Box and Cox (1964), 
uses a power transformation for the dependent variable to allow a flexible 
functional form on the left-hand-side of a regression. The power transforma 
tion requires the estimation of a transformation parameter A, together with the 
linear coefficient vector p and the disturbance variance a2 . Thus, instead of the 
usual normal linear regression model
where y,- is the dependent variable for individual i, the X /s are a collection of 
regressors, the P/s are elements of p, and e,- is the normal disturbance, the 
Box-Cox regression methodology estimates
<y* - 1) / X = ft, + Xfcft + X2,P2 = . . . + XfaB* + e,- . (4A.2)
The Box-Cox transformation parameter K can be any real number. It produces 
a linear regression when X = 1, and as A limits to zero, the left-hand-side of 
equation (4A.2), call it y/x\limits to ln(y,-) so that a semilog regression results. 
Because of this flexibility for the functional form of the left-hand-side, the 
Box-Cox regression methodology is an excellent tool for prediction when the 
functional form of the left-hand-side is unknown.9 In the application described 
above, we estimated A, p and o2 using the NLIN procedure from version 5 of 
the SAS programming language on the IBM 3090 at Syracuse University 
using the 640 cases for which the real transaction value (y,) was known. (The 
sample mean of the real transaction value over these 640 cases was 
$26,542,500.) (See table 4A.1.) For the 544 cases for which the real transac 
tion value was missing but could be predicted, we used p and the appropriate 
values of the X j& for that observation to predict the left-hand-side of equation 
(4A.2), >>j(X). The value for the real transaction value y,- can now be computed 
using the inverse Box-Cox transformation
y,- = W° + D(1/X) • (4A.3)
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In our multinomial logit analysis, we used the actual value of the real trans 
action value for the 640 observations for which it was available, and the pre 
dicted value for the 544 cases for which a prediction was possible. The 
remaining cases were dropped. The sample mean, over the 1,184 cases, of the 
real transaction value used in our analysis was $18,377,500.
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Appendix B to Chapter 4
The purpose of this appendix is to provide the reader with a comprehensive 
account of the specification search that we conducted involving the standard 
multinomial logit, simple nested multinomial logit, and generalized nested 
multinomial models. The search included specifications for the simple and 
generalized nested multinomial logit models with the complete set of state- 
specific covariates involved in the estimation of the preferred standard multi 
nomial logit models (Models I and II) presented in the main text However, 
the specification search also included specifications for all three variants of the 
multinomial logit model on a wider set of state-specific covariates than that 
used for Models I and n.
The widest set of state-specific covariates used in the specification search 
extended to two types of state-specific covariates discussed in chapter 4. The 
first type comprised the state proximity variables. The second type comprised 
the interaction of the pure corporate tax variable with indicators for Japan, the 
United Kingdom and Other Investors, and the interaction of the corporate tax 
variable for worldwide unitary states with the same three indicators. Thus, 
instead of two corporate tax variables as in Models I and II, the specifications 
with the widest set of state-specific variables had six corporate tax variables.
In the standard multinomial logit model, the three proximity variables all 
had positive coefficients statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The 
same thing was true in the simple nested multinomial logit model. However, 
the performance of the six tax variables in the standard and simple nested 
multinomial logit models was not as convincing as the performance of the 
proximity variables. In the standard multinomial logit model, the only one of 
the six that was significant at the 5 percent significance level was the pure 
variable interacted with the indicator for Japan. Using a likelihood ratio test in 
the simple nested multinomial logit specification, we could not reject the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients on the pure corporate tax variables were differ 
ent across the three country groups or that the coefficients on the corporate tax 
variables for worldwide unitary states were different across the three country 
groups.
In all our specifications using the simple nested multinomial logit model, 
the estimates for the dissimilarity parameter exceeded unity and therefore vio 
lated the Daly-Zachary-McFadden condition for consistency with stochastic 
profit maximization. Moreover, they also almost certainly violate Borsch- 
Supan's proposed relaxation of the Daly-Zachary-McFadden condition.
Although the dissimilarity parameter estimates were insignificantly differ 
ent from unity at all conventional significance levels, obvious methodological 
problems would arise if we attempted to use the point estimates from these
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models in simulation experiments. We therefore felt it necessary to examine 
the generalized nested multinomial logit model.
It seemed appropriate, before we started our analysis with the generalized 
nested logit, to choose a baseline specification for the analysis. In doing this, 
we noted that the simple nested logit models without the state proximity vari 
ables produced the lower estimates for the dissimilarity parameter. Given this 
fact, together with the poor general performance of the tax variables differing 
by home country, we chose a set of state-specific covariates that did not 
include the proximity variables and did not allow the tax variables to differ by 
home country.
The results for the generalized nested multinomial logit model are pre 
sented in table 4B.1. Model III presents the results for the baseline specifica 
tion with a distinct value for the dissimilarity parameter for each of the five 
regions. An examination of the dissimilarity parameter estimates indicates that 
the problems arise with the Mountain-Pacific and Northeast regions, where 
the estimates are 1.440 and 1.677, respectively, and the latter is significantly 
different from unity. This suggests that California and New York do not 
belong with the smaller states in their respective regions. To investigate this 
possibility, we estimated Model IV, in which California and New York repre 
sent separate regions. (In so doing, we normalized the dissimilarity parameters 
for the new California and New York regions to equal unity, since these 
parameters are not otherwise identified.) The results for Model IV were better 
for the Mountain-Pacific dissimilarity parameter (1.011) and for the Northeast 
dissimilarity parameter, which is no longer significantly different from unity.
Although the Model IV variant of the analysis appears to have solved the 
important problems facing us, there are at least two reasons why we did not 
want to end with this specification. First, it did not seem completely appropri 
ate to include New York in a region by itself, since both Texas and North 
Carolina received more new plants than New York. Second, standard errors 
for the coefficient estimates increased substantially over Model HI, especially 
on the tax and expenditure variables.
In Model V, we divided the Northeast into its two Census regions, New 
England and Middle Atlantic. This estimation only exacerbated the problem— 
the dissimilarity parameter estimate for the New England region, which 
includes New York, increased in value to 1.993. In a further estimation (not 
shown in table 4A.1), we again divided the Northeast into two regions, the 
first made up of New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Connecticut and 
the second containing the remaining Northeastern states. The same type of 
problem arose.
Accordingly, we decided on a final generalized nested multinomial logit 
estimation, in which six regions were specified—the original five with Cali-
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fornia excluded from the Mountain-Pacific and becoming its own region. The 
results are presented in Model VI. The dissimilarity parameter estimate for the 
Mountain-Pacific region came out to be 1.101, down from the value of 1.440 
in Model III. For the Northeast, the estimate was down to 1.600. This is the 
lowest value of the models considered in this analysis, and unlike the result in 
Model III it is insignificantly different from unity. Still, the point estimate 
clearly violates Bo'rsch-Supan's (1990) necessary condition. Moreover, even 
in this model there is an increased lack of precision in the coefficient esti 
mates, especially for the corporate tax rate variables. We were led to conclude 
that it may be impossible to estimate precisely both the coefficients and the 
dissimilarity parameters. Still there was a lesson to be learned from our inves 
tigation—it is important to separate California from the Mountain-Pacific 
region in the estimation.
NOTES
1. Curme, Hirsch, and MacPherson (1990) have used data from the Current Population Sur 
vey to construct the proportion of unionized workers in the private and public sectors by state for 
the 1983 through the 1988 period. That data combined with earlier estimates from the same data 
source represents a continuous data series of the proportion of the private sector workforce that is 
unionized by state. However, neither series has the percentage of workers unionized in the manu 
facturing sector. We believe that using the total unionized workforce in the manufacturing and 
nonmanufacturing sectors as a proxy variable for unionization in the manufacturing sector would 
subject our results to severe measurement error. We, therefore, did not include the union variable 
in our analysis. In addition, though, regional dummy variables included in the analysis may help 
to capture variations in workforce unionization among regions of the United States.
2. Real values are commonly used in analysis across time to account for the affects of infla 
tion or prices. By deflating, we remove the effects of general price increases.
3. Helms (1985) was the first person to include taxes and spending in his empirical work 
using the state and local government budget constraint.
4. For a discussion of residential, territorial, and mixed tax systems used in various countries, 
see our discussion in chapter 1 and Slemrod (1989).
5. In chapter 2, we noted that the domestic unitary states coincided to some extent with the 
states that receive no foreign investment. Because we believe that a domestic unitary tax dummy 
variable would pick up the effect of other undesirable factors in these states rather than the effect 
of a domestic unitary tax, we have excluded the variable from our model.
6. California was excluded from the Mountain-Pacific region in our preferred specification.
7. In our preferred specification, where California forms its own region, there are 20 variables 
that affect choice of region.
8. The elasticity formulas for all three types are more complicated in the nested multinomial 
logit models (see Borsch-Supan 1987).
9. While prediction using the Box-Cox methodology is straightforward, inference (hypothesis 
testing) is problematic. For discussions of this topic, see Spitzer (1982) and Blackley, Follain, and 
Ondrich (1984).
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Table 4B.1 Generalized Nested Logit Results for State and Region 





Log Real Electric Bill x SIC 28
Log Real Electric Bill x SIC 33
Log Real Gas Bill x SIC 28
Log Real Gas Bill x SIC 33
Attractiveness for SIC 28
Attractiveness for SIC 35



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































of Changes in the Fiscal Policy
of States on State Selection
In this chapter we present the results of three simulations aimed at 
discovering how specific changes in the fiscal policy of individual 
states would have affected the likelihood of their being selected by for 
eign direct investors over the period from 1978 to 1987. As we dem 
onstrated in the preceding chapter, several state fiscal policies have 
considerable influence on whether a foreign firm decides to invest in 
that state. It is, therefore, valuable for states thatdesire to increase their 
share of the total of foreign direct investment to understand which spe 
cific components of their fiscal policy attract or impede foreign invest 
ment. Having identified these components in chapter 4, the simulation 
results presented below help to gauge the amount of foreign invest 
ment that is won or lost by the relative levels of these components.
The results from Model I in chapter 4 indicate that corporate taxes 
have a strong negative effect on the probability that a state is selected 
as a location for a new manufacturing plant, and that this effect is exac 
erbated, although insignificantly in a statistical sense, by the presence 
of a worldwide unitary tax structure in that state. On the other hand, 
using the results from Model I, we learn that individual income taxes 
have a small (insignificant) negative effect on state selection probabil 
ity. If a given state eliminated its corporate tax and replaced it dollar 
for dollar with a higher individual income tax, the effect would be to 
increase its selection probability for each foreign investor (assuming of 
course that the initial level of corporate taxes was positive and not 
zero). This is the scenario for the first simulation, which we call Exper 
iment I.
The second simulation, which we call Experiment II, uses the result 
from Model I that expenditures on higher education (per dollar of state 
personal income) have significant drawing power for new foreign man 
ufacturing plants. Because this effect outweighs the effect of increas-
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ing the individual income tax, if the state were to finance a given 
increase in expenditures on higher education by raising its individual 
income tax, the net effect would be to increase the probability of a 
state's selection as a location for a new manufacturing plant. This is the 
scenario for the second simulation, in which expenditures on higher 
education (as a fraction of state personal income) are increased by 10 
percent. This increase in expenditures is financed, dollar for dollar, by 
increasing individual income taxes.
The third simulation, which we call Experiment III, represents a 
combination of Experiments I and II. In this simulation, corporate 
taxes were eliminated for each state, and expenditures on higher educa 
tion (as a fraction of state personal income) were increased by 10 per 
cent. The combined increase in the deficit resulting from these fiscal 
changes was offset, dollar for dollar, by an increase in individual 
income taxes. Because Experiment III combines the effect of two fiscal 
policy changes that individually have a favorable effect on the state 
selection probability, the results from Experiment III must give the 
largest improvements in the state selection probabilities (except, of 
course, for those states which had no corporate taxes, and for which the 
results would be the same as in Experiment II).
Again, we emphasize that, within each simulation, the changes in 
the fiscal components for each state are made in such a way that the net 
effect of the changes on the overall deficit level is zero. Each simula 
tion gives a result for the period from 1978 to 1987 for each state. The 
result for a given state assumes that only that state made a change in its 
fiscal structure and that all other states left their fiscal structures 
unchanged. In the simulations, therefore, we are abstracting from situa 
tions in which states might react to fiscal changes by other states to 
compete for FDI. Finally, we assume that the fiscal changes for each 
state in each simulation had been in place long enough before the 
beginning of the sample period so that all foreign firms who invested in 
the sample period knew about the altered fiscal status. Thus, we elimi 
nate from our simulations considerations of expectations of fiscal pol 
icy changes.
The remainder of this chapter is divided into two sections. First, we 
discuss the way in which state selection probabilities can be expected 
to change as a result of the simulations. We then discuss the theoretical 
underpinnings for the results and draw some conclusions.
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Simulation Details and Presentation
This section has two goals. The first goal is to describe the manner 
in which state selection probabilities are likely to change as a result of 
the fiscal policy changes within the simulation. The second goal is to 
describe how the simulation results are presented in the next section.
Let us move towards the first goal by asking whether certain simula 
tion results are inherent in the design or estimation of the model. The 
answer is no. Because we use the multinomial logit model, the state 
selection probabilities are a nonlinear function of the deterministic 
profit components (and therefore of the covariates which comprise 
them). Given the nonlinearity of the relationship, the magnitude of the 
effect of a change in a fiscal policy variable depends on its interaction 
with other covariates in the model. Thus, the simulations do not yield 
results that can be anticipated from the magnitude of the particular 
covariate undergoing the policy change. Put differently, the magnitude 
of the change is entirely an empirical question.
Having said this, we examine certain situations that may help us 
gain a better understanding of the simulation results. The first point to 
remember here is that in the model specifications the actual dollar lev 
els in the various tax and expenditure categories do not enter the deter 
ministic component of the stochastic profit function, which is 
ipositively related to the selection probability for that state. Thus, the 
fact that the actual dollar levels in the tax and expenditure categories 
are higher for New York than for Montana is not a reason that the 
selection probabilities for New York will be higher (or for that matter, 
lower) than the selection probabilities for Montana. All fiscal variables 
enter the deterministic components of stochastic profit functions as a 
fraction of state personal income. The fiscal structure of one state is 
more attractive to foreign investors than the fiscal structure of a second 
state only insofar as the first state generally has the higher values as a 
fraction of state personal income in the more favorable fiscal catego 
ries. Similarly, the selection probability of one state will change more 
than the selection probability of a second state as a result of a simula 
tion, all else equal, to the extent that the simulation implies a greater 
shift of these fractions to the more favorable fiscal categories for the 
first state.
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The second situation which we wish to examine can best be 
addressed by asking the following question. Will states with higher or 
with lower initial selection probabilities exhibit the greatest percentage 
changes in these probabilities in response to a given fiscal policy 
change (expressed as a fraction of state personal income)? If, as a 
result of a simulated policy change, two states had the same change in 
deterministic profit levels, the state with the smaller initial selection 
probability will have the larger percentage change in the state selection 
probability.
While we show this result formally below, a policy change need not 
result in the same change in the deterministic profit levels in any two 
states. Thus, whether states with lower selection probabilities have a 
greater percentage change in their selection probabilities is in part an 
empirical question. Nonetheless, this result will help explain why some 
smaller states realize larger percentage changes in their selection prob 
abilities under some of the simulations.
To begin our formal derivation of the above results, let us define TC^ 
to be the deterministic profit level or a given firm in state s. Then the 
firm's selection probability for state i is given by
P(i) = exp[rcj / Z expfr^] , (5.1)
where the summation in the denominator is over all states s. A simple 
calculation gives the derivative of P(i) with respect to n^ as
(5-2) 
The right-hand-side of equation (5.2) reaches a maximum at
(5.3)
Because the highest empirical state selection probability is only 
slightly greater than 0.1 (in the case of California), we can safely 
assume that the greatest increase in the level of the state selection prob 
abilities per unit change in the deterministic profit level occurs for 
those states with the highest initial selection probabilities. However, 
the answer to our question is altered when we examine situations that
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produce the greatest percentage changes in the state selection probabil 
ities.
For example, rearranging equation (5.2) by dividing both sides by 
P(i), we obtain
(dP(f) I dK^ I (P(i) = (1 - P(0), (5.4)
which says that the percentage change in the state selection probability 
is greater per unit change in the state's deterministic profit level, the 
smaller the initial selection probability.
We turn now to a description of the statistics presented in the simu 
lation results in the next section. In each of the three simulations, each 
of the 1,184 firms in our estimation sample will have a state selection 
probability for each state. Needless to say, it is not feasible to present 
information on each firm in all states. We present the expectation 
(expected value) of the number of firms that chose to locate in the 
given state under each fiscal scenario. This expectation is calculated as 
the state's average selection probability (or the average probability 
over the 1,184 firms evaluated at relevant values of the covariates 
using parameter estimates from the Model I standard multinomial 
logit) multiplied by 1,184, the number of firms in the sample. For each 
state in each simulation, the old expectation given is the expectation 
evaluated at the actual (historical) values of the covariates. A new 
expectation can then be calculated which is the expectation evaluated 
at the new covariate values applicable to the specific simulation. The 
percentage change figure that we compute is the difference between 
the new expectation and the old expectation divided by the old expec 
tation.
Simulation Results
The results of the simulations are reviewed in detail below. As the 
empirical results reported in the previous chapter imply, there is signif 
icant variation in the responsiveness of FDI location to different fiscal 
variables. There is also large variation in the location response among 
states to a given fiscal stimulus.
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Corporate Tax Elimination
The first simulation examines the effect on a state's expected num 
ber of new foreign plants if that state and only that state eliminates its 
corporate income tax and raises the lost revenue through its individual 
income tax. The results refer in particular to the percentage increase 
in the new plants attracted to a state during the entire 1978 to 1987 
period and in each of two years—1979 and 1987. The percentage 
changes are reported in table 5.1 along with the baseline or initial val 
ues of new foreign plants for each state. In the text, we discuss the 
results for the entire period only. The experiment produces relatively 
high percentage changes in the number of foreign plants when one 
state undergoes the policy change. While the percentage changes imply 
very different numbers of plants in states due to different baseline val 
ues in each state, the percentage changes appear the best indicator of 
the impact of the policy change from the point of view of the individ 
ual state.
The percentage change in the number of new plants in each state for 
the entire 1978 to 1987 period under Experiment I is illustrated in fig 
ure 5.1, where the percentage change results are grouped by quartile. 
The elimination of the corporate income tax has powerful effects in a 
substantial number of states, if they act alone. The other side of this 
issue is that the simultaneous increase in the individual income tax 
does not substantially reduce the number of foreign plants, or at least 
the net effect of the combined corporate/individual income tax policy 
is quite large, The elimination of a state's corporate income tax would 
have the largest impact (fourth quartile) for the States of Massachu 
setts, California, New Hampshire, Michigan, and North Dakota, Mon 
tana, Oregon, Minnesota, Illinois, Connecticut, Delaware, and Idaho. 
Seven of these states have relatively high corporate tax rates. However, 
the smaller population states among them have corporate tax burdens 
around the median value for states. Of course, the policy has no impact 
in states without a corporate income tax.
There are two major caveats to this conclusion. States will rarely act 
alone. A state that eliminates its corporate income tax will likely have 
imitators. Other states will begin to compete by following the same fis 
cal strategy, and the first-mover advantages will begin to dissipate as 
more states follow the leader. Thus, the estimates reported here over-
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Table 5.1 Experiment I
Percentage Change in Expected Number of Foreign 
Manufacturing Plants Induced by Eliminating the State 
Corporate Tax Financed by Higher Individual Income Taxes, 
















































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5.1 Experiment I
Percentage Change in the Expected Number of Foreign Manufacturing Plants Induced by Eliminating 
the Corporate Income Tax Financed by Higher Individual Income Taxes, 1978 to 1987
Quartile of Smallest Percentage Changes v^:!
2nd Quartile
3rd Quartile
Quartile of Largest Percentage Changes
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state what would happen if many or all states eliminated their corpo 
rate income tax. In addition, the model does not capture any feedback 
effects when the state raises its individual income tax to compensate 
for the revenue lost by elimination of the corporate tax. For example, 
population outmigration might result when individual income taxes are 
increased in a state. That, in turn, could affect the attractiveness of a 
state to foreign investors, especially if skilled workers migrate in sig 
nificant numbers.
One cannot, therefore, take the simulation results too literally. We 
draw the conclusion that corporate income taxes are powerful deter 
rents to foreign firms. High corporate taxes reduce the probability of 
attracting a foreign firm. Nonetheless, other advantages in the state can 
offset an unfavorable corporate income tax position. For example, Cal 
ifornia has attracted significant foreign investment, despite having a 
worldwide unitary tax (although it was eliminated in 1988) and a rela 
tively high effective corporate tax rate.
Increasing Higher Education Expenditures
We ran another simulation in which higher education expenditures 
are increased 10 percent in a particular state and the extra expenditures 
are financed through higher individual income taxes. The higher edu 
cation policy simulation is run very similarly to the corporate income 
tax policy simulation, as described above. It was run for the overall 
1978 to 1987 period and then for each of two years, 1979 and 1987. In 
addition, the simulation assumes that a state increases its higher educa 
tion expenditures and finances it with higher individual income taxes 
with no corresponding action in other states. The results are reported in 
table 5.2, and the results are illustrated in figure 5.2 by quartile of per 
centage changes.
The first observation is that the percentage changes for Experiment 
II are not large relative to those for the corporate income tax. This is 
explained in part by the fact that the change in higher education expen 
ditures only requires only about one-half of the increase in individual 
income taxes compared to what the elimination of the corporate 
income tax rate requires. Even adjusting for the magnitude of the pol 
icy change, however, the increase in higher education expenditures in
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Table 5.2 Experiment II
Percentage Change in the Expected Number of Foreign 
Manufacturing Plants Induced by Increasing State Higher 
Education Expenditures Financed by Higher Individual 
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Figure 5.2 Experiment II
Percentage Change in the Expected Number of Foreign Manufacturing Plants Induced by Increasing 
Higher Education Expenditures Financed by Higher Individual Income Taxes, 1978 to 1987
Quartile of Smallest Percentage Changes
2nd Quartile 
3rd Quartile 
Quartile of Largest Percentage Changes
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larger states has smaller effects relative to the elimination of the corpo 
rate income tax.
The states that have the largest percentage changes in new foreign 
manufacturing plants as a result of changing their higher education 
expenditures are low population states that spend a larger proportion of 
their income to support public higher education. The states with the 
largest effects, for example, include Utah, North Dakota, New Mexico, 
Vermont, Arizona, Wyoming, Iowa, and Delaware. While the-two 
caveats that apply to the corporate income tax apply in this case, it is 
the smaller states for which the higher education strategy would appear 
to pay off the most.
Elimination of Corporate Income Tax 
and More for Higher Education
We have also performed a simulation in which we eliminate the cor 
porate income tax and increase higher education expenditures by 10 
percent, financing that package with higher individual income taxes. 
The results of the simulation reflect the effect for an individual state 
when it alone enacts the fiscal policy change. As such, the caveats 
mentioned above apply here as well.
In effect, the combined policies represent almost a linear combina 
tion of the two separate simulations reported above. The results of the 
combined simulation are reported in table 5.3 and are illustrated in fig 
ure 5.3. The corporate income tax effect is the dominant of the two pol 
icies and the rank order of the states from adopting the combined 
policy changes are not much different from the rankings reported for 
the simulation of the corporate tax elimination policy.
Other Policy Levers
Based on our results, states have relatively few policy levers to 
attract foreign investment. For example, states have almost no direct 
control over their agglomeration economies and their population (or 
market) size that prove to be very dominant factors governing the loca 
tion choices of foreign manufacturers. Moreover, in our analysis, fiscal 
variables, except for the corporate income tax and higher education
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Table 53 Percentage Change in the Expected Number of Foreign
Manufacturing Plants Induced by Increasing State Higher 
Education Expenditures and Eliminating the State Corporate 
Tax Financed by Higher Individual Income Taxes, 1978 
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Figure 5.3 Experiment in
Percentage Change in the Expected Number of Foreign Manufacturing Plants Induced by Increasing 
Higher Education Expenditures and Eliminating the Corporate Income Tax Financed by Higher 
Individual Income Taxes, 1978 to 1987
Quartile of Smallest Percentage Changes
2nd Quartile
3rd Quartile
Quartile of Largest Percentage Changes
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expenditures, have limited impacts on foreign investors location deci 
sions.
States typically use a number of economic development strategies 
and incentives in attempts to attract firms, such as explicit tax incentive 
packages, worker training allowances and programs, and subsidized 
interest loans (Bartik 1991). While the magnitude of the effects of 
these programs on location is largely unknown, states use them regu 
larly to attract major companies to their state. Our results do indicate 
that such programs offering corporate income tax relief may affect the 
location of foreign firms, but that generally speaking states do not have 
a wide array of policy handles available to attract foreign firms. States 
with agglomeration in that industry or a sizable population in or near 






The conclusions that emerge from our investigation of foreign direct 
investment are put together here with those of other researchers to for 
mulate what we believe is a coherent body of information about FDI in 
the United States during the 1978 to 1987 period. While using results 
garnered from analysis of a decade of data to characterize foreign 
direct investment can be somewhat risky, we believe that the consis 
tency of many of our results with the findings of other researchers 
lends credibility to the conclusions we draw. In this chapter, we focus 
on our major results and policy conclusions. We also focus, where 
appropriate, on the facts that state and local policymakers should con 
sider when they bid to attract foreign direct investors.
We reiterate that most of the total (portfolio and direct) foreign 
investment in the United States is done by four countries: United King 
dom, Japan, the Netherlands, and Canada, listed in order of their total 
assets in the United States. These four countries dominate in each of 
the portfolio and foreign direct investment categories of investment. 
However, during the 1980s Japan had the highest rate of growth of 
assets in the United States.
The United States still maintains a surplus (outward minus inward) 
position in FDI, but it has decreased in recent years with inward invest 
ment flows dominating outward flows. By contrast the United States 
has had a negative position in its portfolio investment since 1985.
Benefits and Costs of FDI: Restrictions on Capital Inflows
We have weighed several arguments about the benefits and potential 
costs of FDI in the United States. On balance, we believe that it has 
helped to stabilize our economy, providing jobs for 9.3 percent of the 
U.S. manufacturing workforce. Moreover, the new foreign manufac-
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turing plants built in the United States between 1978 and 1987 were 
overwhelmingly concentrated in four major industry groups: Chemi 
cals and Allied Products, Industrial Machinery and Equipment, Elec 
tronic and Other Electric Equipment, and Transportation Equipment. 
In 1992, for example, workers in two of the major industry groups, 
Chemicals and Allied Products and Transportation Equipment, typi 
cally earned more than 20 percent per hour more than the average 
worker in manufacturing. Workers in the Industrial Machinery and 
Equipment major group earned 6 percent more than the average in 
manufacturing, while workers in the Electronic and Other Electric 
Equipment major group earned 6 percent less per hour than the average 
in manufacturing. Despite the earnings in the last category, we con 
clude that FDI in manufacturing creates largely well-paying jobs.
We acknowledge, however, that continued dominance of worldwide 
investment by investors other than Americans would, over time, make 
us relatively less well off as a people. Thus, we share the concern that 
many advocates for increased worldwide investment by Americans 
have expressed.
Nonetheless, the present debate on U.S. trade policy includes argu 
ments for restricting capital inflows to the United States for purposes 
of gaining strategic advantage in negotiations that would allow Ameri 
can producers access to some foreign markets. Such a policy, if 
adopted, would put existing state efforts to recruit new plants at odds 
with federal policy. States have every incentive to keep recruiting for 
eign investors, because the advantages of attracting foreign plants to 
any particular state's citizens are likely to mask the nationwide eco 
nomic costs of increased foreign investment when all states pursue 
their narrow interests and continue efforts to attract foreign investors.
We caution, however, against restricting states' activities to attract 
foreign investment. We believe that for a variety of reasons, such 
restrictions would do more harm than good, even in the longer term. 
Our rationale, simply put, is that investment decisions are increasingly 
made in a global economy. U.S. investors may find investments in 
Mexico, Canada, and elsewhere relatively more rewarding in the near 
future than they have in the past. In addition, economic income from 
investment will be determined from ownership of global capital rather 
than of domestic capital only. Thus, restricting foreign investment in 
the United States may set up uneconomic incentives for U.S. capitalists
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to invest here rather than abroad and induce misallocation of America's 
capital and lower its long-term income growth. Moreover, the creation 
of American jobs by foreign firms speeds the transfer of technology 
and managerial knowledge to this country.
Aside from the economic arguments, restrictions on FDI appear dif 
ficult to implement, because states engage in direct recruitment efforts. 
To control investment, states might have to submit proposals for FDI to 
a federal review board, where appropriate controls could be imposed. 
A lengthy review process would add to the costs of FDI and, depend 
ing on whether each state was given a particular number of FDI 
projects, could induce inefficient location patterns.
For all of these reasons, we conclude that the imposition of restric 
tions on FDI is not good policy. Policies undertaken to increase domes 
tic saving and, in turn, investment here and abroad will yield better 
long-term income growth in the United States and avoid inefficiencies 
associated with capital inflow restrictions.
Where Should States Seek FDI?
We have focused, in this monograph, on new manufacturing plants 
built in the United States between 1978 and 1987. The home countries 
of investors building new foreign manufacturing plants in the United 
States are somewhat different from the above list of major investors, 
however. In order of their importance, Japan, Germany, the United 
Kingdom, and Canada built most of the new manufacturing plants in 
the United States during the 1978 to 1987 period, with Japan and Ger 
many responsible for over one-half of the new plants in our data. States 
searching for investors might be tempted to begin with these countries 
as the potential sources of direct investment. However, with the recent 
recombination of West and East Germany, German investment in the 
1990s may be more concentrated in Germany than in the United States. 
At this time, Japanese direct investment in the United States has also 
dampened. Thus, states should seek investors with new ideas and effi 
cient production techniques in the state's major industries. Countries 
that have high productivity will likely generate significant domestic 
saving that can be invested abroad. These countries can also reap the 
first-mover advantages associated with early penetration into a new
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country or market. Also, if the United States imposes trade restrictions 
in certain goods, FDI or production in the United States represents an 
opportunity to circumvent those restrictions. Thus, federal trade 
restrictions create FDI opportunities for states.
While new foreign plants were constructed in 19 of the 20 major 
manufacturing industry groups, plants were primarily built, as 
mentioned above, in four major industry groups: Chemicals and Allied 
Products, Industrial Machinery and Equipment, Electronic and Other 
Electric Equipment, and Transportation Equipment, listed in order of 
the number of plants built. Investors from Germany, Japan, the United 
Kingdom, and Canada also tended to dominate as the major builders 
of new plants in these four major groups. However, investors from 
Switzerland and France were major new plant builders in several of 
the four major groups.
The location of new plants was concentrated in relatively few states. 
Staying with the four major industry groups cited above, Texas, North 
Carolina, and New Jersey captured a major share of the new foreign 
plants in Chemicals and Allied Products, while California and Georgia 
captured a major share of the new plant investment in Electronic and 
Electrical Equipment. New plants in the Industrial Machinery and 
Equipment major group tended to locate in North Carolina, California, 
Connecticut, and Georgia. Ohio, Michigan, Tennessee, California, and 
Illinois captured a major share of the new plants in the Transportation 
Equipment major group.
When all industries and all home investor countries are considered, 
California, Georgia, Illinois, New York, North Carolina, Texas, and 
Tennessee each received 50 or more new foreign plants during the 
1978 to 1987 period. The locations of most of the rest of the new plants 
were concentrated in the eastern half of the United States.
What Attracts FDI to States?
FDI is driven by market size, agglomeration economies, and, to a 
lesser extent, cost and fiscal factors. In what follows, we review the 
major findings of the study, and, where appropriate, compare them to 
those in the recent literature on FDI location.
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Markets
First, we do not find that per capita income and the growth of per 
capita income in a state are important variables for attracting foreign 
investors. While other authors have found that per capita income is sig 
nificant in determining state location choice, their conclusions are gen 
erally based on cross-sectional data rather than a pooled cross-section 
time-series sample. Still, our results suggest that regional markets are 
not significant variables in the determination of new plant locations, 
and that requires further explanation.
Two explanations for the above result are possible. First, drawing on 
the results in a separate literature on the determinants of aggregate- 
investment flows to the United States, we suggest that the sizable mar 
ket in the United States as well as international trade barriers that pre 
vent certain goods from entering the United States determine the 
willingness of investors to build new manufacturing plants somewhere 
within the United States. One might conclude that most of the new 
plants are producing for the U.S. market in general and, once the deci 
sion to locate in the United States is made, the per capita income of a 
particular state has little, if any, influence on the investor's decision to 
locate a new manufacturing plant in that state. Production for a U.S. 
market may be especially the case for the plants in the four major 
industry groups that dominate the sample.
An alternative explanation is that the population size of the state, 
which has a significant coefficient and relatively large elasticity for 
FDI location, has measured market potential in the model rather than 
the per capita income level or growth variables. Thus, population size 
represents regional market potential as well as an available workforce.
Wages
We do not find that real wages in a state influence the location of a 
new foreign plant in a significant way. We are somewhat surprised by 
that result. We reason that investors might regard U.S. wages as high 
relative to the rest of the world and, in the case of the United States, 
wages do not play a significant role in decisions of foreign investors to 
locate here. Carried one step further, wage variation within the United 
States is not of sufficient consequence to foreign investors to influence 
their state location choices. Added to our evidence is that other
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researchers have not uniformly found that wages influence FDI loca 
tion decisions among states or within states. For example, one 
researcher (Woodward 1992), who has examined the state as well as 
the county locations of Japanese investments, does not find that wages 
are a significant determinant of the state location or the county location 
choice within the state. Other variables apparently drive the location 
choices of foreign plants. For example, the set of states with the speci 
fied desirable characteristics may not have significant variation in 
wage rates among them. The caveat is that we and others are unable to 
account completely for labor productivity differences across states, and 
that could bias the results on the wage variable.
Agglomeration
Agglomeration economies measured here as a high concentration of 
employment in the major industry group within a state have proved a 
powerful locational determinant for foreign manufacturing plants. So 
powerful are the agglomeration effects in three industries that in the 
estimation we have had to take special account of the attraction of 
Chemicals and Allied Products to Alabama, Delaware, Louisiana, 
New Jersey, and Texas, of Industrial Machinery and Equipment to 
Connecticut, and of Transportation Equipment to Kentucky, Michigan, 
and Ohio.
The findings about agglomeration economies are interesting and 
need interpretation. To some extent, the finding implies that FDI in 
manufacturing plants typically occurs in the traditional areas of manu 
facturing strength in a state. However, a large share of the FDI in man 
ufacturing plants has located in 10 relatively highly populated states. 
Thus, the relative concentration of the industry group in question as 
well as the fact that the industry group has a relatively large presence 
in a relatively large state economy, measured by number of employees 
or capital investment, makes a state attractive as a location for a for 
eign manufacturing state. Access to the skilled labor pool in that indus 
try, proximity to similar firms or to networks of intermediate input 
suppliers, and availability of information about market trends and tech 
nological change in the industry represent the major advantages con 
ferred by agglomeration. However, a less populated state, such as 
Delaware or Wyoming, for example, might have a relative agglomera 
tion in a major group and still not attract FDI. Those states may not
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have enough of any industry to reap the substantial gains that arise 
from the absolute size of an industry's presence.
Another implication of the results for the agglomeration economies 
variable concerns the fact that foreign investors compete with firms in 
the state's traditional major industry group. At the national level, Ray 
(1989) argues that FDI may displace traditional domestic industries, 
and there is some question as to whether such foreign investment 
should be encouraged. However, from an individual state's vantage 
point, the new foreign manufacturing plant will probably locate some 
where within the United States (perhaps in a neighboring state) and 
compete with the domestic producers located in the state in question 
anyway. Thus, not inviting the new plant to a particular state will not 
substantially reduce the competition its existing firms face in the global 
or even the national economy. A state would be wise to capitalize on its 
comparative advantage in a particular industry group and recruit simi 
lar types of firms to build plants in the state.
Fiscal Effects
We have also done a significant amount of work modeling the fiscal 
effects of state and local expenditures and taxes on location choice. 
Taxation of foreign corporations is an especially complicated area, 
because whether taxes in the host country matter at all depends on 
home country tax policy toward foreign investment, as well as a large 
number of factors that underlie the effective tax rate of the foreign 
plant. We have employed Helms (1985) budget constraint in our 
model, modified by the state's stance on taxation of multinational 
firms. Helms' method requires choosing a numeraire and interpreting 
the coefficients relative to the numeraire. Following Helms, we have 
chosen welfare spending as the numeraire and find that states with a 
higher deficit or higher user charges to finance higher welfare spending 
deterred the location of new foreign plants. Lower spending on higher 
education to finance welfare expenditure is also a deterrent to location 
of new foreign plants. States with higher corporate income taxes will 
deter new foreign plants from locating within them.
The results for the corporate income tax are so strong that we have 
devised simulations to explore the effect on the probability of attract 
ing more foreign plants if in any single state the corporate income tax 
were eliminated and the revenues were raised using the state personal
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income tax instead. The simulations suggest that the shift away from 
the corporate income tax would have a very strong positive effect on 
the number of foreign plants locating within a state. We emphasize, 
however, that tax policy changes of this magnitude typically have a 
large number of other implications that affect firm and household deci 
sions about locating within the state. Our simulations could not take 
into account many of the other implications of eliminating the corpo 
rate income tax. Our results are, therefore, suggestive of the strong 
influence that corporate income taxes have on the location of foreign 
plants. Put another way, reducing corporate taxes would make the state 
more attractive to foreign manufacturing plants, but eliminating the 
corporate income tax would surely have behavioral repercussions that 
could dampen the strong effect that we report in the simulations.
The magnitude of our results for the corporate income tax effect dif 
fers substantially from the weak role that other researchers find. We 
attribute the difference to our more careful modeling of the state and 
local budget. Most other research partially models state and local 
taxes, and virtually ignores the expenditure side of the fiscal picture. 
Apparently, the improved modeling of the fiscal sector leads to our 
more precise results.
Another dimension of tax policy is unitary taxation. During certain 
times in the 10-year analysis period, as many as 11 states used a world 
wide unitary definition of the income of foreign corporations. A tax, 
such as worldwide unitary, that is specifically directed at FDI might be 
expected to deter FDI substantially. Nonetheless, we do not find, as 
other researchers have, that the use of worldwide unitary taxation had a 
significant effect on the locations of new foreign plants. We attribute 
our finding to using a longer period of analysis and the fact that many 
states were phasing out worldwide unitary taxation during the time 
period of our analysis. For example, a substantial number of new man 
ufacturing plants located in California during the 1978 to 1987 period, 
and California operated a worldwide unitary tax system during that 
period. However, in 1988 California eliminated its worldwide unitary 
tax and moved to a water's edge unitary definition. 1 Foreign investors 
probably anticipated its elimination and thus the unitary tax was not a 
deterrent to location in California during a significant portion of our 
analysis period. In Florida, the worldwide unitary tax was abolished 
after one year. Similar stories can be told in other states.
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To close, we believe that FDI has significant employment effects in 
states. States seeking to attract such investment might look beyond the 
traditional four countries, because Germany and Japan may not now 
have the substantial pools of domestic saving to invest here. States will 
find opportunities for FDI from countries with high productivity which 
has typically produced high savings rates. These countries may be 
looking for first-mover advantages in investing abroad or for avoid 
ance of tariff or other trade barriers that may have been imposed on the 
importation of their products. Those situations seem to produce high 
potential for FDI.
Furthermore, states can make themselves more attractive to FDI by 
reducing corporate income taxes and maintaining a high-quality sys 
tem of higher education. However, populous states with large concen 
trations of the FDI industry in question have received most of the FDI 
in manufacturing. We expect size and agglomeration will continue to 
play a major role in state-level FDI location decisions.
NOTE
1. The Wall Street Journal (Tax Report, August 4, 1993, page 1, and Politics and Policy, 
August 19, 1993, page A12) has recently reported that controversy still surrounds California©s 
unitary system. Barclays Bank has appealed to the Supreme Court to reject the unitary system. A 
spokesperson for Price Waterhouse commented that California©s modified approach (water©s edge 
unitary) did not appease all critics.
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